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RISE OF THE MACHINES: MACHINE-GENERATED DATA AND THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE† 
 
Brian Sites* 
 
Forensic machines and other such devices can create powerfully 
incriminating evidence, and some do so with little or no human aid. In a world 
where machines increasingly perform that task, what happens to the right to 
cross-examine the human witnesses who would have testified but for the 
machines? Through errors, bias, and even fabrication, machine operators, 
calibrators, and others involved in the forensic process still have the power to 
cause these tools to incriminate the wrong person. There is no shortage of 
evidence that this occurs. Many courts have concluded, however, that there is no 
right to cross-examine the operators of these machines. This Article analyzes 
that result.  
The Article begins by discussing Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
from across the nation, including machine-generated testimony cases and areas 
of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence that might be instructive in addressing 
machine-generated data, such as cases involving photographs, videos, 
interpreters, and dog handler testimony. The Article then considers the strengths 
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and weaknesses of several potential approaches to machine-generated testimony 
and concludes that multiple approaches are defensible, but the approach that 
best adheres to the purposes of the Confrontation Clause focuses on the degree 
and nature of the operator’s control over the machine. Under that model, there is 
no right to cross-examine the operators of many modern machines. Though that 
result is troubling, there are alternative models that might extend the lifespan of 
the Confrontation Clause. However, as machines become increasingly 
automated, the right to cross-examine their human assistants and progenitors 
will approach extinction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
“[D]ata are not ‘statements’ in any useful sense. Nor is a 
machine a ‘witness against’ anyone. If the readings are ‘statements’ 
by a ‘witness’ against the defendant, then the machine must be the 
declarant. Yet how could one cross-examine a gas 
chromatograph?”1 
 
“[T]he witnesses with whom the Confrontation Clause is 
concerned are human witnesses . . . .”2 
 
Machines are vital tools for investigating crimes. In this 
digital age, they create powerfully incriminating evidence, and 
some do so with little or no human aid. Even for machines that 
require some human decision-making, most machines do the 
heavy-lifting in analysis and data generation. The machines of the 
future will do amazing things, but those in the present are already 
impressive: facial-recognition software;3 3D lasers and forensic 
drones that map crime scenes;4 enhanced law enforcement tools;5 
and self-calibrating forensic tools are just the beginning.6  
                                            
1.  United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008). 
2.  United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(emphasis in original). 
3.  See, e.g., David Kravets, Facial Recognition Nabs 14-year Fugitive in 
Nepal, FBI says, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 13, 2014, 12:20 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/08/facial-recognition-nabs-14-year-fugitive-
in-nepal-fbi-says/. 
4.  See, e.g., 3D Forensic Mapping, LEICA GEOSYSTEMS, http://www.leica-
geosystems.us/forensic/3d_scanning.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2014) (describing 
its ScanStation model, which “allows the 3D data . . . to automatically be 
mapped onto the data producing a visually stunning 3D rendering of the 
scene”); Katie Collins, Laser-mapping crime scenes officially a thing, 
WIRED.CO.UK. (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-
02/13/3d-mapping-crime-scenes (discussing use of 3D mapping devices in 
Australia); Domestic drones are already reshaping U.S. crime-fighting, 
REUTERS.COM (Mar. 3, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/Article/2013/03/ 
03/us-usa-drones-lawenforcement-idUSBRE92208W20130303 (including a 
comment from a Colorado sheriff’s deputy, “[w]e can now bring the crime scene 
right into the jury box, and literally re-enact the crime for jurors”). 
5.   See Victor Li, Law enforcement’s latest highway tech speeds up info-
gathering, but critics say it violates privacy, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 1, 2014, 4:10 
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/Article/data_driven_latest_highway_ 
technology_speeds_up_info_gathering_but_critics/ (describing use of automated 
license-plate readers and Stingray, a tool that imitates a cell phone tower to gain 
information from mobile devices). 
6.  Among other technologies on the horizon are the FBI’s new “Next 
Generation Identification” system and also an “autonomous” five-foot, 300 lb. 
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These are not negative developments. But, in a world 
where machines increasingly create evidence against defendants, 
what happens to the right to cross-examine the human witnesses 
who would have testified but for the machines? Through errors, 
bias, and even fabrication, machine operators, calibrators, and 
others involved in the forensic process still have the power to cause 
these persuasive tools to incriminate the wrong person. There is no 
shortage of evidence that this occurs.7  
Many courts have concluded, however, that forensic 
machines speak with a voice of their own, and those statements—
the raw data of a machine—invoke no Confrontation Clause right.8 
Although courts hold that the statements of lab analysts in lab 
reports are testimonial,9 for machine-generated data, courts have 
widely held that it is not the analysts who make the statements: the 
declarants are the machines, and there is no right to cross-examine 
a machine.10 Mass spectrometers, scales, breathalyzers, and gas 
chromatographs alike thus have a story of their own, and they tell 
                                            
K5 robot designed “to predict and prevent crime” through “predictive analytics” 
and “social engagement.” Next Generation Identification, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2014) (“This program will further advance the FBI’s biometric 
identification services, . . . offer[ing] state-of-the-art biometric identification 
services and . . . a flexible framework of core capabilities that will serve as a 
platform for multimodal functionality.”). 
7.  See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2250 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (stating that lab procedures have often been abused and listing 
sources in support of that observation); Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the 
Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475 passim (2006) (same); DNA Exonerations 
Nationwide, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php (last visited Aug. 17, 2014) 
(describing analysis of 316 post-conviction exonerations and attributing 
“unvalidated or improper forensic science” as “play[ing] a role in 49 percent of 
wrongful convictions later overturned by DNA testing”); Roma Khanna & Steve 
McVicker, Probe finds crime lab faked results in 4 cases, HOUSTON CHRONICLE 
(June 1, 2005), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/Article/Probe-finds-
crime-lab-faked-results-in-4-cases-1494739.php (noting, e.g., that one of the 
analysts continued to work at the lab years later). Machines can also make 
mistakes on their own. See, e.g., David Kravets, License plate reader error leads 
to traffic stop at gunpoint, court case, ARS TECHNICA (May 12, 2014, 5:43 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/after-being-held-at-gunpoint-due-to-lpr-
error-woman-gets-day-in-court/.  
8.  See infra Part III. 
9.  See generally Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
10.  See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 229-30 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
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it in a language immune to the Confrontation Clause.11 The result 
is that some evidence once subject to the Confrontation Clause—
because it came in the form of individuals testifying about what 
they saw or what they did—no longer triggers a confrontation right 
because machines now generate the evidence in place of 
humans.12  
A right to cross-examine human agents will not catch or 
prevent all errors,13 but it will prevent some.14 Further, analysts are 
sometimes unavailable for important reasons as illustrated in recent 
cases: the analyst might have been indicted for making false 
statements under oath,15 have a relevant mental illness,16 or have 
been placed on “unpaid leave” for unspecified reasons.17 
Revealing that information to the jury, in the analyst’s own words, 
may be important. However, that right will come at a price, and 
not just as a matter of efficiency.18 In some cases, a right to 
confront the operator of the machine will lead to the exclusion of 
                                            
11.  See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“the instruments’ readouts are not ‘statements’, so it does not matter whether 
they are ‘testimonial’”). 
12.  See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 n.3 (2011) (“The 
trial judge [in this case] noted that, when he started out in law practice, ‘there 
were no breath tests or blood tests. They just brought in the cop, and the cop 
said, ‘Yeah, he was drunk.’”). Notably, machines producing evidence in place of 
humans might do so through different methods. For example, while the officer 
might have testified that he believed based on his own observations that the 
defendant was drunk, a breathalyzer machine testifies to that conclusion based 
on an analysis of the defendant’s breath. 
13.  See, e.g., Merritt Baer, Who Is the Witness to an Internet Crime: The 
Confrontation Clause, Digital Forensics, and Child Pornography, 30 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 49-51, 56 (2013) (noting some 
examples where such a right would not be beneficial). 
14.  See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2246 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (noting such an example); id. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (same). 
15.  See, e.g., Lee v. State, 418 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tex. App. 2013), petition 
for discretionary review refused (Mar. 12, 2014). 
16.  See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 
2011). Many mental illnesses would not be relevant, but some would. 
17.  See, e.g., Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2707. 
18.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 542 (Pa. 2013) 
(concluding that a system using fewer analysts would cause more errors than an 
assembly line process); Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: 
Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 154 
(2012) (“[D]raconian Confrontation Clause rules might well motivate laboratories 
to make . . . modifications [such as reducing the number of analysts]. But if these 
modifications took laboratories in directions inconsistent with the practices of 
science more generally, it is far from clear that these would be positive 
developments.”). 
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evidence where the original analyst simply changed jobs,19 
relocated,20 is on maternity leave,21 or is deceased.22 That could 
lead to a windfall for defendants. 
This Article addresses the question at the heart of this issue: 
are machine-generated “statements” immune to the Confrontation 
Clause? And if machines can make statements of their own, how 
do we sort out the machine-generated statements from the 
statements by their operators? What about machines that operate 
with de minimis human control? Which of these, if any, are 
immune to the Confrontation Clause, where is the line, and how is 
that line determined?  
To answer these questions, this Article takes a “weigh all 
sides” approach and considers multiple models, identifies cases 
and theories that support them, and assesses each model’s 
weaknesses. This Article, though based on the study of several 
forensic and other machines, takes a machine-agnostic approach 
instead of tying analysis to specific machines because the details 
are everything, and the machines will vary in important ways from 
model to model and setting to setting (including non-lab settings).  
In Part II, the Article highlights important portions of the 
Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Next, 
Part III describes the machine-generated testimony doctrine and 
cases from around the nation that address this doctrine, most of 
which have held that there is no right to cross-examine machine 
operators. Part IV reviews other areas of Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence that might be instructive in addressing machine-
generated statements, such as cases involving photographs and 
videos, interpreters, and dog handler testimony. Those cases, too, 
have generally held there is no right to cross-examine the operators 
of a camera, an interpreter who merely translates, or a canine, 
though there is an interesting twist as to the latter two groups of 
cases. Finally, Part V weighs several potential approaches to 
machine-generated testimony and describes their strengths and 
weaknesses. Ultimately, the Article concludes that several 
approaches are defensible, but argues that the approach that best 
adheres to the purposes of the Confrontation Clause focuses on the 
                                            
19.  See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2008). 
20.  See, e.g., State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Mo. 2007); State v. 
Roach, 95 A.3d 683, 687-88 (N.J. 2014). 
21.  See, e.g., State v. Oliphant, 127 So. 3d 91, 102 (La. Ct. App. 2013). 
22.  See, e.g., Scott v. Mule Creek State Prison, No. ED CV 07-909 SVW 
PJW, 2010 WL 5563805, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2010), aff'd, 504 F. App'x 658 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
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degree and nature of the operator’s control over the machine. 
Under that model, there is no right to cross-examine the operators 
of many modern machines. In its final sections, this Article 
discusses the extent to which that result is troubling and considers 
alternative models that might extend the lifespan of the modern 
Confrontation Clause. 
Machine-generated testimony does not exist in a vacuum, 
and there are other doctrines that may affect the use of machines 
to generate evidence. Though this Article remarks on some such 
parallel areas, they are not the focus here. One example is the 
question that divided the Supreme Court in Williams v. Illinois23 as 
to whether a supervisor may—without violating the Confrontation 
Clause—testify in court based on evidence that, if admitted directly, 
would violate the Confrontation Clause. That divisive question 
requires its own separate article, and though the answer to that 
question could significantly affect the use of machine-generated 
testimony, it will not always do so, and courts are still working 
through what Williams means for Confrontation Clause cases.24 
Further, some machine-generated data that is likely to be at issue in 
a criminal trial should be viewed as being admitted for the truth of 
the matter asserted, as others have already articulated, and thus 
admission of that data should require the testimony of the data’s 
underlying author (who, this Article argues, is not always just the 
machine).25 
                                            
23.  See generally Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (4-1-4 
decision). 
24.  See, e.g., DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. 
MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.12.11 (Aspen Publishers 
2014); People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 483 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) (“The 
nine separate opinions offered by this court in the three confrontation clause 
cases decided today reflect the muddled state of current doctrine concerning the 
[Confrontation Clause].”). 
25.  See generally DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. 
MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.10.1 (Aspen Publishers 
2014) (rejecting the argument that the otherwise-inadmissible underlying 
information is not being admitted for its truth but instead to help the jury 
evaluate the testifying expert’s testimony, and thus a surrogate analyst/expert 
should be permitted to disclose the underlying information to the jury); id. at 
§ 4.10.2 (addressing the harder question of whether an expert may rely on, but 
not disclose to the jury, otherwise-inadmissible evidence); id. at § 4.12.5 
(addressing this question as it pertains to machine-generated data). 
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Finally, there are other avenues through which a defendant 
might seek protection in a given case, such as hearsay rules,26 other 
constitutional rights,27 and the requirement of establishing an 
evidentiary foundation.28 Some courts have concluded, for 
example, that the rules of evidence and especially foundation 
requirements are the best (or only) proper way to challenge 
machine-generated data.29  
However, the question of whether machine-generated data 
triggers the Confrontation Clause is an important separate 
question. First, as a definitional matter, it is important to identify 
the boundaries of the Confrontation Clause and how it should 
adapt (if at all) to fundamental changes in criminal trials. Second, 
to the extent that the machine-generated data doctrine is in tension 
with analogous doctrines under the Clause, that division 
undermines consistency and is generally jurisprudentially 
problematic. Thus, it is important to consider those parallels. 
Third, the availability of a right under the Confrontation Clause is 
important because it may trigger different analyses at trial and 
different standards of review on appeal.30 And, as a practical 
matter, some judges may simply take objections founded on an 
alleged constitutional error more seriously. Finally, in at least some 
situations, the other protections that might require the testimony of 
a machine’s operator before admission of the machine’s data at 
trial—evidentiary requirements, for example—are simply not doing 
the job.31 It is a fair critique that we should target any such failings 
                                            
26.  But see Fed. R. Evid. 801(a) (“‘Statement’ means a person’s oral 
assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an 
assertion.”) (emphasis added). 
27.  See, e.g., Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673, 674-
76 (Alaska 1990) (“[W]e hold that due process requires that the defendant be 
given an opportunity to challenge the reliability of that [breath test] evidence in 
the simplest and most effective way possible, that is, an independent test [of the 
defendant’s intoxication level].”). 
28.  See, e.g., Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 150-51 (holding, based on a 
mix of Confrontation Clause and evidentiary foundation rules, that introduction 
of data generated by a breathalyzer without any accompanying testimony from 
the operator of the machine was error), modified in part on reh’g, 827 N.E.2d 
565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing the prior opinion in part). 
29.  See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
30.  See, e.g., United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(addressing different standards of review); March, 216 S.W.3d at 664 (same). 
31.  The existence of numerous machine-generated data cases that tackle 
the issue from a Confrontation Clause angle—instead of having required 
operator testimony at trial based on foundation requirements—provide some 
evidence of this potential problem. See infra Part III.  
44 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. [Vol. XVI 
of evidentiary requirements directly, but that does not remove the 
value of also contemplating how the Confrontation Clause 
functions in an increasingly automated world or the other 
rationales for asking such questions. Accordingly, we turn now to 
the question of whether and to what extent the Confrontation 
Clause applies to machine-generated testimony. 
II. MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”32 It applies in 
both state and federal prosecutions.33 The Supreme Court has 
noted that the relatively simple text of the Clause is susceptible to 
multiple interpretations, including that the Clause embraces “those 
who actually testify at trial, those whose statements are offered at 
trial, or something in-between[.]”34 Similarly, judges and 
commentators alike have noted that the intended scope and history 
of the Confrontation Clause are less well-known than some other 
amendments; in other words, “the Confrontation Clause comes to 
us on faded parchment.”35 Nevertheless, the Court has made do, 
and five cases are the most relevant to machine-generated 
testimony.36 Although the Supreme Court has not directly resolved 
the issue of how the Confrontation Clause applies to machine-
generated data, these cases provide the foundation for answering 
that question. They also give shape to the modern Confrontation 
Clause right generally while defining its edges in areas such as 
witness statements during and after emergencies and the use of 
forensic reports that are signed by various parties.  
                                            
32.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
33.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965); see also Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (citing Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406). 
34.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42 (citations omitted). 
35.   California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause.”); Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: 
Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and "At Risk", 14 WIDENER L. 
REV. 427, 428, n.7 (2009) (collecting sources and noting “the lack of 
contemporaneous documentation of the Framers’ motivations and intentions 
regarding [the Confrontation Clause]”). 
36.  Readers looking for a full description of these cases have plenty of 
options to choose from. See, e.g., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE supra 
note 25, § 4.12.11; Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: 
Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 103-17 
(2012). 
2014] RISE OF THE MACHINES 45 
The first of those cases is Crawford v. Washington, decided 
in 2004.37 In Crawford, a husband stabbed a man and claimed self-
defense, but the wife’s recounting of the event to police was 
arguably inconsistent with a self-defense theory.38 The wife refused 
to testify, asserting a state marital privilege, so the State introduced 
her prior out-of-court statement.39 The Court held that admitting 
the statement violated the husband’s Confrontation Clause right.40 
In so holding, the Court jettisoned41 the then-twenty-four-
year-old precedent, Ohio v. Roberts.42 Under Roberts, the analysis 
focused on hearsay law and the reliability of the evidence.43 The 
Court concluded in Crawford that this approach failed to 
adequately address the core concerns of the Confrontation Clause 
and stated that “[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do 
not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s 
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to 
amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”44  
Instead, the Court concluded that while the Confrontation 
Clause’s “ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence . . . it is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not 
that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a 
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”45 The Court then announced the new standard for 
Confrontation Clause claims, though it declined to spell out the 
standard in full: “Where testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the 
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: 
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”46 
The heart of Crawford, then, is the relatively undefined 
term “testimonial,” for only evidence that crosses into that category 
triggers the requirements of unavailability and prior opportunity to 
cross-examine. Notably, Crawford also indicated a preference for 
clear lines in place of malleable, imprecise standards: “[The 
Framers] were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands. 
                                            
37.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.  
38.  Id. at 40. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. at 68. 
41.  Id. at 60-68. 
42.  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
43.  Id. at 62-67. 
44.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; see also id. at 51. 
45.  Id. at 61. 
46.  Id. at 68 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Richard D. 
Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports, Round Four, 45 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 57 (2012). 
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By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended 
balancing tests, we do violence to their design.”47  
In the second Confrontation Clause case, Davis v. 
Washington, the Court again declined to adopt a comprehensive 
definition of “testimonial.”48 Davis involved two consolidated cases: 
in one case, a woman called 911 to report an ongoing emergency 
(domestic abuse), and in the second case police officers responded 
to an alleged incident of domestic abuse that had ended.49 In both 
cases, the prosecution sought to introduce out-of-court statements—
the 911 call and the statements of the woman in the second case.50 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority as he did in 
Crawford, reiterated that “[o]nly [testimonial] statements . . . cause 
the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.”51 Statements are testimonial, he explained, 
when “the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”52 Applying that test, the Court held that the 
statements in the 911 call were not testimonial because they 
reflected an ongoing emergency, were intended to help resolve 
that emergency rather than just to learn about a potential past 
crime, and were part of an exchange that was not significantly 
formal.53 On the other hand, the statements in the second case 
were testimonial because they were “part of an investigation into 
possibly criminal past conduct,” were somewhat formal (involving 
separate interviews of the man and woman in different rooms), and 
“the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation 
was to investigate a possible crime.”54 In short, the statements 
“d[id] precisely what a witness does on direct examination.”55 
Finally, the Court cautioned in Davis that “[r]estricting the 
Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was 
originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.”56 This warning 
                                            
47.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (citations omitted); see also Whorton v. 
Bocktin, 549 U.S. 406, 414 (2007) (criticizing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) 
as “too ‘malleable’ in permitting the admission of ex parte testimonial 
statements”) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S at 60)). 
48.  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
49.  Id. at 817-21. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. at 821. 
52.  Id. at 822; see also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011). 
53.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (discussing each of these factors). 
54.  Id. at 829-30. 
55.  Id. at 830 (emphasis in original). 
56.  Id. at 830 n.5. 
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parallels a remark in Crawford that “[a]ny attempt to determine the 
application of a constitutional provision to a phenomenon that did 
not exist at the time of its adoption . . . involves some degree of 
estimation . . . but that is hardly a reason not to make the 
estimation as accurate as possible.”57 
The third case, Melendez-Diaz, tackled the question of lab 
reports.58 Justice Scalia, penning his third opinion in the testimonial 
trilogy, considered a case involving three “certificates of analysis” 
that stated the results of forensic tests performed on certain seized 
substances.59 Those certificates reported the date the bags were 
analyzed, an identifying number, the officer who submitted the 
bags, a certification by the analyst that the substance was found to 
contain cocaine, how much the samples weighed, the defendant’s 
name, analyst signatures, a notary public notarization, and other 
information.60 While the details varied from certificate to 
certificate—such as the weight of the substance and the identifying 
number—most of the information was the same across all three 
documents.61 The analysts who signed the reports did not testify at 
trial, despite the defendant’s objection under the Confrontation 
Clause.62 
The Court held that the lab reports were “within the core 
class of testimonial statements” under Crawford and Davis.63 The 
Court first noted that the certificates were “functionally identical to 
live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on 
direct examination.’”64 Justice Scalia continued, explaining:  
[N]ot only were the affidavits “made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial,” but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of 
the affidavits was to prove prima facie evidence of the 
                                            
57.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 n.3 (2004).  
58.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
59.  Id. at 307. 
60.  Appendix A, Memorandum and Order Pursuant to Rule 1:28, 
Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 921 N.E.2d 108 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (No. 
05-P-1213) available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/ 
02/07-591_ob.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).  
61.  Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. at 310 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
64.  Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)). 
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composition, quality, and the net weight of the analyzed 
substance.65 
Thus, the affidavits were testimonial statements, and the 
analysts who prepared them were witnesses for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment.66  
In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the Court took one further 
step towards addressing the definition of “testimonial” under the 
Confrontation Clause.67 The prosecution charged the defendant in 
that case with driving while intoxicated and submitted the 
defendant’s blood sample for analysis.68 The resulting report 
identified the analyst who conducted the test, the date and time the 
sample was drawn, the reason for the defendant’s detention 
(“Accident”), and contained certifications from the nurse and 
officer as to the blood draw and chain of custody information.69 
The report also listed the defendant’s blood-alcohol content 
(“BAC”) as determined via gas chromatograph, certified that the 
analyst received the sample with seal unbroken, affirmed that the 
analyst followed lab procedures listed on the back of the report, 
and certified the analyst’s findings.70 The supervising lab employee 
also certified that the analyst was qualified to conduct the BAC test 
and that the “established procedure” for handling and analyzing 
the sample had been followed.71 
At trial, the prosecution did not call the analyst who 
conducted the analysis to testify because he had recently been 
placed on unpaid leave for reasons unstated.72 Instead, the 
prosecutor called a different analyst and introduced the BAC 
report through that analyst.73 The New Mexico Supreme Court 
subsequently concluded that the analyst who prepared the report 
“was a mere scrivener” who “simply transcribed the results 
generated by the gas chromatograph machine.”74 That court 
further stated that the “true ‘accuser’ was the gas chromatograph 
                                            
65.  Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
66.  Id. 
67.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
68.  Id. at 2710.  
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 2710-11. 
71.  Id. at 2711. 
72.  Id. 2711-12.  
73.  Id. 
74.  State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8-9 (N.M. 2010) (citing, e.g., United 
States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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machine,”75 and noted that the substitute analyst that testified in 
court could be cross-examined about the machine, the lab’s 
procedures, and the BAC results.76 Thus, the Confrontation Clause 
allegedly was not violated. 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. The primary 
holding in Bullcoming was that the analyst certified more than the 
BAC data; he also certified, via the report, that he: received the 
defendant’s sample intact and sealed, performed a specific test by 
following lab protocols, and that there were no anomalies in that 
process that might have “affect[ed] the integrity of the sample or 
. . . the validity of the analysis.”77 The Court also concluded that 
the prosecution could not enter the testimonial report through the 
substitute testimony of another analyst that was familiar with the 
process.78  
Justice Sotomayor provided the fifth vote in Bullcoming, 
but she did so with some reservations. In her concurrence, she 
highlighted the fact that Bullcoming did not present the question of 
whether one expert could offer his or her opinion in court based 
on underlying testimonial records that were not themselves 
admitted.79 Justice Sotomayor also noted that “we do not decide 
whether . . . a State could introduce (assuming an adequate chain 
of custody foundation) raw data generated by a machine in 
conjunction with the testimony of an expert witness.”80  
In Williams v. Illinois,81 the Court attempted to answer the 
first of those two questions. However, Williams was a fractured 
decision involving testimony of one analyst who relied on a DNA 
typing done by a non-testifying analyst from a different lab.82 In a 
plurality opinion by Justice Alito, four Justices upheld the 
testimony against a Confrontation Clause challenge, concluding 
that the lab results were not introduced for their truth but instead 
to show the basis of the expert analyst’s opinion, and thus the 
Confrontation Clause was not at issue given the non-truth use.83 
The plurality also stated that, even if the results were introduced 
for their truth, they were not testimonial because they were not for 
                                            
75.  Id. 
76.  Id.  
77.  Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 (alteration in original) (quoting the lab 
procedures) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
78.  Id. at 2715-16. 
79.  Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). 
80.  Id. 
81.   Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality).  
82.   Id. at 2229. 
83.   Id. at 2233-44. 
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the primary purpose of targeting a specific individual, they were 
created pursuant to an ongoing emergency (catching a rapist), and 
the results were reliable.84 
Justice Thomas concurred in result only, providing the fifth 
vote; he rejected the plurality’s reasoning in full but, under his own 
test, concluded that the results were not sufficiently formal and thus 
did not trigger the Confrontation Clause.85 The four dissenting 
justices agreed with Justice Thomas that the plurality’s test was 
incorrect and a departure from the Court’s Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence, but they also rejected Justice Thomas’s formality 
test.86 This 4-1-4 decision—with five votes rejecting the plurality’s 
reasoning yet upholding the admission of the results only because 
the results were insufficiently formal for Justice Thomas—has 
generally led to confusion in state and federal courts about the 
impact of Williams.87  
While Williams has some general import in terms of one 
expert testifying based on the results of another non-testifying 
expert, it does not shed significant light on the underlying question 
of when machine-generated results trigger the Confrontation 
Clause, nor does it clearly resolve when an expert may testify 
based on machine-generated data that the expert did not 
generate.88 Even if it did, however, it remains relevant whether the 
underlying data is machine-generated or not, as that can shape 
various matters, including what an analyst may rely on and 
disclose to the factfinder.89 In light of the open questions and 
                                            
84.   Id. at 2242-44. 
85.   Id. at 2255-64 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
86.   Id. at 2264-77 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
87.   See, e.g., Marc D. Ginsberg, The Confrontation Clause and Forensic 
Autopsy Reports—A “Testimonial,” 74 LA. L. REV. 117, 135 (2013); cf. Williams, 
132 S. Ct. at 2244 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This case raises a question that I 
believe neither the plurality nor the dissent answers adequately . . . .”). 
88.  See, e.g., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 24, 
§ 4.12.6 (“[N]or does [Williams] offer any potential further analysis of the issues 
surrounding machine-produced information relied upon by experts.”); DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN ET AL., 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 31:38 (2013-14 ed.) 
(“Because Williams appears directly at odds with Bullcoming and Melendez-
Diaz, and because it was a highly fractured opinion, it is difficult to know what 
to make of its ultimate scope. Moreover, some of the open questions left 
unresolved by those earlier cases persist—such as exactly who among those who 
come into contact with evidence must testify to satisfy constitutional 
requirements.”).   
89.   See, e.g., 5 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 42:15 (2013-14 ed.). 
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general confusion after Williams, it is likely that the Court will 
speak again on the Confrontation Clause, and soon.90 
III. MACHINE-GENERATED DATA AND THE RISE OF THE MACHINES 
Under the machine-generated testimony doctrine, courts 
across the nation have held that machine-generated data does not 
trigger the Confrontation Clause because it is the machines—not 
the analysts operating them—that make the statements at issue, and 
machines are not “witnesses” within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.91 As is described further in Part V, this rise 
of the machines is arguably inconsistent with the treatment of 
forensic evidence in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, and it is an 
exception that could swallow their holdings whole as machines 
become increasingly widespread and automated. This Part 
discusses the contours of the machine-generated testimony doctrine 
and cases promoting it, beginning with the doctrine’s genesis in 
United States v. Washington.92 
In Washington, a police officer pulled over an individual 
engaging in erratic driving and took him to a hospital where the 
defendant consented to giving a blood sample.93 The sample was 
sent for analysis, and the forensic machines printed out 
approximately twenty pages of data.94 Based on the data, the lab 
director issued a report stating the blood sample contained certain 
amounts of intoxicants.95 The three analysts who actually 
                                            
90.   See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic 
Laboratory Reports, Round Four, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 82 (2012). In the 
course of editing this Article, the Court granted certiorari in Ohio v. Clark, No. 
13-1352, 2014 WL 1882769, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014). 
91.   See infra notes 92–120. See also Peter Nicolas, But What If the Court 
Reporter Is Lying? The Right to Confront Hidden Declarants Found in 
Transcripts of Former Testimony, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1192-93 (2010) 
(noting, while addressing a different issue, that “the Confrontation Clause 
encompasses only statements by people”). 
92.  United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007). Though 
other cases preceded Washington, in the post-Crawford world, Washington 
functions as the first test to adopt this analysis. See, e.g., Joe Bourne, 
Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial: When is a Lab Report 
Testimonial?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1058, 1079-80 (2009) (describing Washington as 
“an analytical angle from which no other court had approached a Crawford 
issue pertaining to forensic science”). 
93.  Washington, 498 F.3d at 227-28. 
94.  Id.  
95.  Id.  
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conducted the tests using the machines did not testify in court, but 
their supervisor testified based on the raw data.96  
At trial, the defendant claimed a right to cross-examine the 
three analysts themselves, arguing that the lab director’s reliance 
on raw data from tests he neither performed nor observed violated 
the Confrontation Clause.97 The trial court disagreed and admitted 
the testimony.98 The Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal99 and 
explained that: 
[T]he “statements” in question are alleged to be the 
assertions that [the defendant’s] blood sample contained 
PCP and alcohol. But those statements were never made by 
the technicians who tested the blood. The most the 
technicians could have said was that the printed data from 
their chromatograph machines showed that the blood 
contained PCP and alcohol. The machine printout is the 
only source of the statement, and no person viewed a 
blood sample and concluded that it contained PCP and 
alcohol. . . . In short, the inculpating “statement”—that [the 
defendant]’s blood sample contained PCP and alcohol—was 
made by the machine . . . . But “statements” made by 
machines are not out-of-court statements made by 
declarants that are subject to the Confrontation Clause.100 
The court also supported its conclusion on other grounds. 
First, the court concluded that there was no value in cross-
examining the technicians: the machines made the statements, and 
the technicians would know only what the machine data had told 
them.101 Second, the Fourth Circuit stressed that if the concern was 
the reliability of the data, that issue would be properly addressed 
through the process of authentication of the evidence,102 and if the 
defendant wanted to question the technicians, he could subpoena 
them into court.103 Finally, the court concluded that the statements 
made by the machines were not testimonial because “the 
machine’s output did not ‘establish or prove past events’ and did 
                                            
96.  Id. at 228-29. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. at 227. 
99.  Id. at 232. 
100.  Id. at 229-30. 
101.  Id. at 230. 
102.  Id. at 232 (discussing the requirements of laying a foundation). 
103.  Id. at 231 n.3. 
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not look forward to ‘later criminal prosecution.’”104 And so the 
machine-generated testimony doctrine was born.105  
Many courts have found this doctrine persuasive.106 In 
United States v. Blazier, the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces went so far as to state that “it is well-settled that under both 
the Confrontation Clause and the rules of evidence, machine-
generated data and printouts are not statements and thus not 
hearsay—machines are not declarants—and such data is therefore 
not ‘testimonial.’”107 In United States v. Moon, the Seventh Circuit 
endorsed Washington’s approach in a case involving raw data from 
an infrared spectrometer and a gas chromatograph.108 As in 
Washington, Moon involved one expert testifying in court based 
on the raw data produced by analysis that a different analyst 
conducted.109 The Seventh Circuit held that the conclusions the 
non-testifying chemist came to were testimonial, but the raw data 
from the machines was not.110 Similarly, in United States v. 
Lamons, the Eleventh Circuit cited approvingly both Washington 
and Moon, holding that data produced by a machine 
memorializing telephone calls made was not testimonial because 
“the witnesses with whom the Confrontation Clause is concerned 
are human witnesses,” and the data in Lamons was the statement 
of a machine.111  
The endorsement of Washington has not been limited to 
appellate courts. In United States v. Crockett, a federal district 
court held that “[t]he instrument readouts and printouts” resulting 
from analysis of cocaine did not implicate the Confrontation 
Clause or hearsay rule.112 Nor has support been confined to 
                                            
104.  Id. at 232 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). 
105.  See, e.g., Joe Bourne, Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial: 
When is a Lab Report Testimonial?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1058, 1079-80 (2009). 
106.  See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, No. PWG-13-0251, 2014 WL 
2919792, at *6 (D. Md. June 26, 2014) (“[A] machine cannot bear witness against 
an accused within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause . . . . [O]nly a 
human may be a declarant . . . .”). But see United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (concluding, without analyzing the machine-generated 
testimony doctrine, that the testimony of one analyst about, inter alia, the results 
of a test violated the Confrontation Clause). 
107.  United States v. Blazier, 69 M.J. 218, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2010). 
108.  United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2008). 
109.  Id. at 360-61. 
110.  Id. at 361. 
111.  United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1260-61, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(emphasis in original). 
112.  United States v. Crockett, 586 F. Supp. 2d 877, 885 (E.D. Mich. 2008); 
see also Adams v. United States, No. 09-6152 (GEB), 2011 WL 1792562, at *3-4 
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federal courts.113 For example, in Hamilton v. State, a Texas state 
court held that the raw data produced by DNA analysis was a 
machine-generated statement and “[t]he Confrontation Clause 
implicates statements made by persons, not machines.”114 In 
People v. Lopez, the Supreme Court of California held that 
“[b]ecause, unlike a person, a machine cannot be cross-examined, 
here the prosecution’s introduction into evidence of the machine-
generated printouts . . . did not implicate the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to confrontation.”115 The Connecticut Supreme Court, relying 
heavily on Washington, reached a similar result.116 Courts have 
reached analogous conclusions for, e.g., DNA results,117 
breathalyzer results,118 urinalysis results,119 and machine-generated 
data from equipment outside the lab.120 Some courts have also 
                                            
(D.N.J. May 10, 2011) (addressing, as an alternative basis for the court’s ruling, 
the merits of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas corpus claim that alleged error under 
the Confrontation Clause, and citing, e.g., Washington and Moon). 
113.  See, e.g., Leger v. State, 732 S.E.2d 53, 60 (Ga. 2012) (supervisor may 
testify about data generated by other analysts); People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 
931 (N.Y. 2009) (“The . . . report, furthermore, was not ‘testimonial’ . . . because 
it consisted of merely machine-generated graphs, charts and numerical data.”); 
State v. Keck, No. 09CA50, 2011 WL 1233196, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 
2011) (no Confrontation Clause violation where one analyst testified to her 
analysis, which was based in part on the apparently machine-generated DNA 
results that another analyst produced); cf. State v. Ortiz-Zape, 743 S.E.2d 156, 
162 (N.C. 2013) (citing Washington and Moon approvingly), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 2660 (2014); State v. Dilboy, 48 A.3d 983, 989 (N.H. 2012) (noting that 
testimony based on “raw data, such as graphic or numerical computer printouts, 
. . . [might] not . . . violat[e] . . . the Confrontation Clause”). 
114.  Hamilton v. State, 300 S.W.3d 14, 21-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009). 
115.  People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 478 (Cal. 2012). 
116.  State v. Buckland, 96 A.3d 1163, 1172 (Conn. 2014) (“We hold that the 
machine generated data is not subject to the restrictions imposed by Crawford, 
Melendez–Diaz and Bullcoming.”). 
117.  See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 244 P.3d 1163, 1166 (Ariz. 2010); People v. 
Arauz, 2D CRIM. No. B242843, 2013 WL 3357931, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 3, 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2664 (2014).  
118.  See Cranston v. State, 936 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); 
People v. Dinardo, 801 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Mich. App. Ct. 2010); Wimbish v. 
Commonwealth, 658 S.E.2d 715, 719-20 (Va. Ct. App. 2008). 
119.  See Marshall v. People, 309 P.3d 943, 947 (Colo. 2013); United States 
v. Bradford, 2009 WL 4250093, at *9 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009); 
United States v. Anderson, 2009 WL 4250095, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 
23, 2009); United States v. Skrede, 2009 WL 4250031, at *3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
Nov. 23, 2009). 
120.  See, e.g., Stultz v. Artus, No. 04-CV-3170 (RRM), 2013 WL 937830, at 
*9-10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2013) (automated message stating a payphone’s phone 
number was a statement by a machine, which falls outside the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause); cf. Robertson v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 531, 532-33 
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reached the same results without specifically discussing machine-
generated testimony, such as decisions based on the general 
observation that a supervisor may testify about tests performed by 
other analysts or the specific point that the supervisor may rely on 
raw data generated by other analysts.121 
Washington also has staying power; it was decided in 2007, 
before Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams, and the petition 
for certiorari was still pending when the Court issued Melendez-
Diaz.122 Though the Court granted petitions for certiorari in other 
cases and remanded them for reconsideration in light of Melendez-
Diaz, the Supreme Court denied the petition in Washington.123 In 
the wake of these various decisions, the Fourth Circuit has not 
overruled Washington.124 Several courts have held that 
Washington’s approach is still sound after Melendez-Diaz, 
                                            
(Va. Ct. App. 2013) (en banc) (involving, but not addressing as such, machine-
generated prices from a cash register). 
121.  See Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 854-55 (Fla. 2009) (per curiam) 
(discussing this issue and citing Washington and Moon approvingly); id. at 878-
79 (Canady, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the Court’s opinion only on other 
issues); Rector v. State, 681 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ga. 2009) (holding that a 
toxicologist could testify about tests and results obtained by another doctor 
because the toxicologist “reviewed the data and testing procedure” and “[a]n 
expert may base [his] opinions on data gathered by others”) (second alteration 
in original); State v. Roach, 95 A.3d 683, 694-99 (N.J. 2014) (an analyst who 
tested one DNA sample may testify about a DNA match based on results that 
depended, in part, on testing for a second DNA sample that another analyst 
generated); Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 540 (Pa. 2013) (“[W]e hold 
that [the reviewing supervisor] is the analyst who determined Appellant's [blood-
alcohol content]. Although he relied on the raw data produced by the lab 
technicians [who ran the machines] . . . he is the only individual who engaged in 
the critical comparative analysis of the results of the . . . tests . . . and determined 
Appellant's BAC.”); see also id. at 541-42 (collecting cases); cf. United States v. 
Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005) (computer-generated header 
“was generated instantaneously by the computer without the assistance or input 
of a person” and so, in the context of the hearsay rules, there was no “statement” 
or “declarant”) (collecting cases). 
122.  See United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. 
denied, 557 U.S. 934 (2009). 
123.  See Washington v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009) (denial of cert. 
petition). This does not mean that the Supreme Court necessarily approved of 
the result in Washington, as there are many reasons a court of discretionary 
jurisdiction might deny review. The point only is that the Court had an 
opportunity to address the doctrine post-Melendez-Diaz, or at least to require the 
Fourth Circuit to reconsider in light of Melendez-Diaz, but declined to do so. 
124.  See, e.g., United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 202-03 (4th Cir. 
2011) (alleles were machine-generated data; distinguishing Bullcoming and 
Melendez-Diaz). 
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Bullcoming, and Williams.125 For example, in United States v. 
Darden, a federal district court in Maryland (a court in the same 
federal circuit as Washington) held that Melendez-Diaz did not 
disturb the logic of Washington.126 The Seventh Circuit has also 
adhered, post-Williams et al., to its conclusion in Moon.127 Other 
courts, considering the issue for the first time or upon 
reconsideration after the Williams et al. decisions, have also held 
that machine-generated data does not trigger a confrontation 
right.128 Indeed, courts expressly considering the rationale in 
Washington appear to widely agree that raw data is not testimonial 
under the new post-Crawford line of cases.129 
The rise of machines has not been without resistance, 
however. For example, jurisdictions that have adopted the 
machine-generated testimony doctrine or something similar have 
not done so without dissent.130 And in Young v. United States, the 
D.C. Circuit found a Confrontation Clause violation where a 
supervisor gave surrogate testimony about DNA tests that she 
neither conducted nor was present for; in doing so, the court 
“emphasize[d] . . . that it is too simplistic to say that the DNA 
profiles and the [random-match probability] were not hearsay 
                                            
125.  See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 656 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563-64 (E.D. 
Ma. 2009); Hamilton v. State, 300 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. App. 2009); United States 
v. Anderson, No. 2009-06, 2009 WL 4250095, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 
23, 2009). 
126.  Darden, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 563-64. 
127.  See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 726-27 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
128.  See, e.g., Oliver v. State, No. 14-09-00690-CR, 2010 WL 3307391, at *4 
(Tex. App. Aug. 24, 2010); United States v. Drayton, Criminal No. PWG-13-
0251, 2014 WL 2919792, at *8-9 (D. Md. June 26, 2014); People v. Lopez, 286 
P.3d 469, 478 (Cal. 2012); People v. Revill, No. B233987, 2013 WL 6094307, at 
*9-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2013). 
129.  See, e.g., United States v. Bradford, Misc. Dkt. No. 2009-07, 2009 WL 
4250093, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009) (not reported) (“A survey of 
the case law following the issuance of Melendez-Diaz reveals [that] the courts are 
focusing on the requirement that an expert testify and that he or she do so using 
the data produced by the labs as the basis for his or her testimony. The lab 
technicians were not required to be produced as witnesses.”), rev’d on other 
grounds by 68 M.J. 371 (C.A.A.F. 2010). 
130.  See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 232 (Michael, J., 
dissenting); State v. Roach, 95 A.3d 683, 698-701 (N.J. 2014) (Albin, J., 
dissenting); cf. Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 711 (Ind. 2009) (Rucker, J., 
dissenting) (not addressing the machine-generated testimony doctrine, but stating 
“despite whatever ambiguity Melendez–Diaz may have created on the question 
of who must testify at trial, it appears to me the opinion is clear enough that a 
defendant has a constitutional right to confront at the very least the analyst that 
actually conducts the tests”). 
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because they were ‘nothing more than the raw data produced by a 
machine.’”131 Thus, though courts have widely concluded that 
machine-generated data does not require the testimony of the 
analyst who operated the machine, the consensus is not 
unanimous. 
IV. PARALLEL DOCTRINES UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
This Part considers areas of Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence that address analogous areas to the machine-
generated testimony doctrine: photographs, videos, interpreters, 
and dog-handler testimony. These areas, just like machine-
generated data cases, involve an assertion by one entity that is 
arguably attributable to (or at least influenced by) a separate entity. 
Under these cases, courts have frequently rejected Confrontation 
Clause claims seeking to cross-examine a camera operator, 
interpreter, or canine. However, they have not done so without 
dissent, and courts frequently require the testimony of a dog’s 
handler when canine evidence is at issue.  
This Part summarizes cases from around the country on 
these topics. In Part IV, we consider whether those parallel areas 
might offer guidance for analyzing machine-generated data. For 
example, if the raw print-out of a gas chromatograph is subject to 
cross-examination, shouldn’t the print-out of a camera—a 
photograph—be as well? Similarly, if the digital output of a 
breathalyzer triggers a confrontation right, would the digital output 
of a surveillance camera? If neither photographs nor videos trigger 
a Confrontation Clause right, why should other machine-generated 
data?  
Notably, although these separate doctrinal lines have 
parallels to machine-generated data, they are in some ways very 
different. Those differences are discussed in Part IV. Further, some 
                                            
131.  Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting 
United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 2011)). The D.C. Circuit 
went on to state that “the [data at issue] do[es] not stand on [its] own but, 
instead, ha[s] meaning because [it] amount[s] to a communication by the 
scientists who produced [it]—the assertion, essentially, that the scientists 
generated these specific results by properly performing certain tests and 
procedures on particular, uncorrupted evidence and correctly recording the 
outcomes.” See also United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 
2011) (concluding, without analyzing the machine-generated testimony doctrine, 
that the testimony of one analyst about, inter alia, the results of a test violated the 
Confrontation Clause); cf. Martin v. State, 60 A.3d 1100, 1106 (Del. 2013) 
(lending some support to the right to cross-examine the operating analyst in 
machine-generated data contexts).  
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of these doctrines are in tension with the post-Crawford 
Confrontation Clause. However, the purpose of this section is not 
to critique these parallel fields. Instead, it is to identify potential 
anchors for analysis of machine-generated data. In the course of 
describing those proposals, Part IV identifies some problems with 
these anchors so as to avoid mooring the ship in treacherous 
waters. 
A. Photographs and Videos 
A photograph transcribes reality into a fixed image, but the 
angle, shutter speed, and other decisions made by the 
photographer shape that transcription.132 Indeed, the notion that 
there is an authoring element to taking a photograph—a human 
contribution—is central to other legal issues, such as the 
copyrightability of images.133 And at least for forensic photographs, 
                                            
132.  One term used to refer to this is “camera perspective bias,” and some 
studies have shown that camera perspective and depth of image alter 
interpretation of confessions. In one such study, individuals who viewed a video 
of a defendant’s confession were more likely to believe the confession was 
coerced if the interrogator was visible in the video than if the interrogator was 
not visible. Additionally, the angle from which evidence, such as blood splatters, 
is photographed can alter perception and analysis of the evidence. As one court 
described it: 
Somewhat depends for exact likeness upon the nice 
adjustment of machinery, upon atmospheric conditions, 
upon the position of the subject, the intensity of the light, 
the length of the sitting. It is the skill of the operator that 
takes care of these, as it is the skill of the artist that makes 
correct drawing of features, and nice mingling of tints, for 
the portrait. . . . The portrait and the photograph may err, 
and so may the witness. That is an infirmity to which all 
human testimony is lamentably liable.  
Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 478 (1881). See also Heimbach v. Peltz, 121 
A.2d 114, 116-17 (Pa. 1956); Commonwealth v. McKellick, 24 A.3d 982, 996 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2011) (Donohue, J., dissenting); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Videotaped 
Confessions Can Be Misleading, NEW YORK TIMES (July 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/opinion/videotaped-confessions-can-
be-misleading.html; Dave Munger, False confessions: Even judges are biased by 
camera perspective, SCIENCE BLOGS (Mar. 15, 2007), 
http://scienceblogs.com/cognitivedaily/2007/03/15/false-confessions-even-
judges/; see generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic 
Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 4, 20-27 (1998).  
133.  See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519, 522 
(7th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases discussing photographers’ contributions to the 
originality of photographs and the derivative work right); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy 
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the images are often the photographer’s assertion about reality: 
“this is the crime scene,” “this is the wound at issue,” “this is the 
defendant,” and so on. If viewed as assertions by human operators, 
a photograph taken in anticipation of trial might be seen as 
testimonial and subject to the Confrontation Clause.  
However, courts have often admitted photographs without 
any discussion of Confrontation Clause matters, and many cases 
hold that there is no requirement that the photographer be cross-
examined prior to the admission of the photograph.134 Courts have 
admitted, despite challenges based on the Confrontation Clause, 
images of lost evidence,135 the crime scene,136 the victim,137 the 
crime itself,138 and other matters.139 These holdings stem, in part, 
from the view that photographs are often seen as demonstrative or 
                                            
Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1073-77 (9th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases and 
describing the history of copyright protection for photographs). In the Copyright 
Office’s draft of its copyright practices compendium, it states that “the Office will 
refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human being did not create the 
work.” Compendium of the U.S. Copyright Office Practices 300 (3d ed. Aug. 19, 
2014) (draft of the compendium); see also id. at 301 (“Similarly, the Office will 
not register works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that 
operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention 
from a human author.”). 
134.  See, e.g., Sevin v. Parish of Jefferson, 621 F. Supp. 2d 372, 383 (E.D. 
La. 2009) (addressing images from red-light cameras); People v. Williams, No. 
302154, 2013 WL 163818, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2013) (photos of a 
victim’s injuries and a shotgun the defendant allegedly possessed); State v. 
Williams, 913 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Tenn. 1996) (surveillance images taken by a 
store camera the cashier triggered during a robbery). 
135.  See, e.g., United States v. Beach, 196 F. App’x 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(per curiam) (photographs of seized evidence that police lost were not shown to 
“conceivably constitute the ‘testimonial’ statements that Crawford bars”). 
136.  State v. Newcomb, No. 43578-1-II, 2014 WL 2601699, at *3 (Wash. Ct. 
App. June 10, 2014). 
137.  See, e.g., People v. Ellis, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378, 387-89 (Ct. App. 2013), 
review granted and opinion superseded, 301 P.3d 1176 (Cal. 2013); People v. 
Myers, 928 N.Y.S.2d 407, 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Williams v. State, No. 09-
12-00350-CR, 2014 WL 1102004, at *5 (Tex. App. Mar. 19, 2014); Herrera v. 
State, 367 S.W.3d 762, 773 (Tex. App. 2012); Phipps v. People, 54 V.I. 543, 564-
65 (2011).  
138.  See, e.g., People v. Goldsmith, 326 P.3d 239, 250 (Cal. 2014). 
139.  See, e.g., State v. Chavez, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0731, 2009 WL 4981849, at 
*3-4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (addressing, inter alia, Confrontation Clause 
challenge to photographs of an individual, T.A., “throwing [gang] signs,” 
through which the prosecution sought to show that T.A. was in a gang that was a 
rival to defendant’s gang). 
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illustrative evidence, i.e., they merely illustrate verbal testimony 
and are not evidence in and of themselves.140 
Similarly, except when they contain a person speaking in a 
testimonial capacity,141 courts have often admitted videos without 
requiring cross-examination pursuant to the Confrontation 
Clause.142 This is true even though, or perhaps because, videos 
may be seen as “better than eyewitnesses because films are 
perceived as never mistaken.”143 There are also many cases that 
involved the admission of video evidence without discussion of a 
right to confrontation, often because the video was viewed as 
merely demonstrative evidence.144 As with photographs, courts 
have admitted, despite Confrontation Clause challenges, several 
types of videos, including recordings of field sobriety tests,145 a 
                                            
140.  See, e.g., State v. Newcomb, No. 43578-1-II, 2014 WL 2601699 at *3 
(Wash. Ct. App. June 10, 2014) (“[C]ourts regard photographs as demonstrative 
evidence . . . . The proper foundation for photographs requires only that some 
witness . . . be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what 
circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the photograph accurately 
portrays the subject illustrated.”); see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of 
Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN, n.129 at 44-45; cf. People v. Thomas, 269 P.3d 1109, 1136-37 (Cal. 
2012) (rejecting Confrontation Clause claim raised against the use of a police 
artist’s drawings of the scene because the depictions were not admitted for their 
truth but instead only to illustrate witness testimony).  
In some cases, the images have no apparent human photographer, such as 
for images from red-light cameras. See, e.g., People v. Goldsmith, 326 P.3d 239, 
249-50 (Cal. 2014); State v. Melsky, No. A-0193-12T2, 2013 WL 1776037, at *4 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 26, 2013) (per curiam). 
141.  See, e.g., Coronado v. State, 351 S.W.3d 315, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2011) (concluding that “[v]irtually all courts that have reviewed the admissibility 
of forensic child-interview statements or videotapes after the Davis decision have 
found them to be ‘testimonial’ and inadmissible unless the child testifies at trial 
or the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination”) (collecting 
cases); see also State v. Hooper, 176 P.3d 911, 914-16 (Idaho 2007) (“Since the 
purpose of a forensic interview is to collect information to be used in a criminal 
prosecution, . . . the interview was the functional equivalent of a police 
interrogation [and the video was testimonial].”). 
142.  See, e.g., Amparo v. McDonald, No. C 09-0801 MMC (PR), 2012 WL 
1094291, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) (“Because a camera is not a witness 
that is amenable to cross-examination, and because a photograph . . . is not a 
testimonial statement, the videotape here at issue does not implicate the 
Confrontation Clause.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
143.  Jessica M. Silbey, Judges As Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic 
Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 516 (2004). 
144.  See id. at 507 (2004) (collecting cases). 
145.  Commonwealth v. McKellick, 24 A.3d 982, 985-89 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2011); Delgado v. State, No. 10-10-00164-CR, 2011 WL 4389956, at *3-4 (Tex. 
App. Sept. 21, 2011). 
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store camera’s footage of a crime,146 and other surveillance 
videos.147 
B. Interpreters 
Interpreters have met mixed results under the 
Confrontation Clause, but defendants generally have no right to 
cross-examine them. Some courts have held that an interpreter’s 
translation of the defendant’s statements triggers the Confrontation 
Clause,148 but many others have held that an interpreter is merely 
a “language conduit” or agent for the defendant and, therefore, the 
defendant is the declarant and has no right to cross-
examine/confront him or herself.149 The language conduit and 
agency approaches differ in their underlying tests, but the end 
                                            
146.  See, e.g., State v. Wynn, No. 2011CA00244, 2012 WL 3068361, at *5-6 
(Ohio Ct. App. July 16, 2012). 
147.  See, e.g., Vaughn v. State, 13 N.E.3d 873, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) 
(videos of a confidential informant purchasing drugs were not testimonial 
because they “were not meant to be an assertion” and “merely showed the 
conduct of the CI and [defendant]”); State v. Perkins, No. 09–CR–0280, 2011 
WL 2345291, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 6, 2011) (video tape created by law 
enforcement of the defendant approaching the site of a drug transaction was not 
testimonial in nature because “the tape[] [was] merely being used to establish the 
context of a defendant’s statements and not to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted [therein]”); State v. Smith, No. M2010-02077-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 
3776679, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2012) (admission of video of drug 
transaction did not violate Confrontation Clause because some statements 
therein were made by defendant and some were not introduced to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted). 
148.  See, e.g., United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1322-31 (11th Cir. 
2013) (officer’s in-court testimony about translation of defendant’s answers 
during an interrogation violated defendant’s right to confront the interpreter, 
who was the declarant of those statements, but no plain error in light of lack of 
prior binding precedent on that point). 
149.  See, e.g., United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Budha, 495 F. App’x 452, 454 (5th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Desire, 502 F. App’x 818, 821 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Romo-
Chavez, 681 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2012); Hernandez v. State, 662 S.E.2d 325, 
330 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); see also Charles, 722 F.3d at 1333 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(Marcus, J., specially concurring) (collecting cases); United States v. Skiljevic, 
No. 11-CR-72, 2013 WL 3353960, at *4-5 (E.D. Wis. July 3, 2013); People v. 
Malanche, No. F060845, 2012 WL 688069, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2012) 
(unpublished); People v. Jackson, 808 N.W.2d 541, 550-52 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2011). For more discussion of a defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine 
his or her own confession, see Mark A. Summers, Taking Confrontation 
Seriously: Does Crawford Mean That Confessions Must Be Cross-Examined?, 76 
ALB. L. REV. 1805 (2012-13). 
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result is the same: the defendant is treated as the declarant.150 In 
analyzing such claims under the Confrontation Clause or hearsay 
rules, courts have considered several factors: who supplied the 
interpreter; the interpreter’s skill at translation and relevant 
qualifications; whether there is any indication that the interpreter 
had a motive to mislead or distort; whether there was any 
indication of inaccuracy in the translation; and whether the actions 
the parties took after the conversation were consistent with the 
translations.151   
Three key issues reoccur in those results: who is the 
declarant of the translated material, when are the translations 
testimonial, and when are the translations used to establish “the 
truth of the matter asserted” therein?152 Notably, with regards to 
the lattermost of those three issues, the Eleventh Circuit has held 
that translators implicitly assert that the translation provided is 
accurate: “when the translator created the transcripts, he or she 
represented that each English word, phrase, or concept 
corresponded to the original Spanish word, phrase, or concept.”153 
Finally, some courts, even while recognizing that a defendant has a 
right to inquire into the translator’s honesty and competency, have 
concluded that the Confrontation Clause does not require that 
such a right be achieved through cross-examining the translator.154 
 
 
                                            
150.  See, e.g., People v. Morel, 798 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005) (describing the tests in the hearsay rule context: “[T]he agency approach 
. . . treats a translator’s rendering of a declarant’s statement as if it were the 
declarant’s own once the agency relationship is established, as opposed to the 
conduit theory which attributes a translator’s statements to the declarant so long 
as the translator’s skill and fidelity to a proper translation is established[.]”). 
151.  See, e.g., Charles, 722 F.3d at 1324-25 & n.6; Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 
at 959-61; Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139; Skiljevic, 2013 WL 3353960, at *4-5; 
Hernandez, 662 S.E.2d at 329-30; Jackson, 808 N.W.2d at 552.  
152.  See, e.g., United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 962 (2014). 
153.  Id. 
154.  See, e.g., Morel, 798 N.Y.S.2d 315, 319 (concluding that “the 
translator’s willingness and capacity to render statements accurately from one 
language to another . . . is a purely state-law ‘reliability’ issue” and the translator 
was a mere language conduit); Hernandez 662 S.E.2d at 330 (citing Morel). An 
analogous problem is whether a court reporter’s transcript of testimony raises 
Confrontation Clause problems. See generally Peter Nicolas, But What If the 
Court Reporter Is Lying? The Right to Confront Hidden Declarants Found in 
Transcripts of Former Testimony, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1149 (2010) (discussing 
this issue). 
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C. Canine Units 
Criminal defendants sometimes seek to “cross-examine” a 
canine working as either a drug-sniffing dog or a tracker.155 Under 
the normal definition of “cross-examine,” that request is impossible 
to fulfill, and so the defendant is asking either to exclude such 
evidence (presumably categorically) or to require the prosecution 
to bring the dog to court so the defendant may “be confronted 
with the witness[] against him,”156 perhaps so the animal could be 
tasked with demonstrating its tracking or drug-sniffing abilities, 
which are the canine’s relevant “testimony” in any event.157 Courts 
have rejected this and other similar claims under a number of 
overlapping rationales: dogs are not capable of making testimonial 
statements;158 the dog is not the witness, the handler is;159 and dogs 
are not witnesses or declarants within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause and the rules of evidence.160 Along the way, 
                                            
155.  Compare State v. Washington, No. OT–12–032, 2014 WL 1343696,    
at *12 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2014) (drug-sniffing case), with State v. Keodara, 128 
Wash. App. 1040, 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (tracking case). 
156.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
157.  For an example of a case seeking to bring the dog to court, see United 
States v. Carroll, 710 F.2d 164, 168 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983). 
158.  See, e.g., State v. Washington, 2014 WL 1343696, at *12 (“The dog 
sniff is not a statement, nor is the dog capable of making a testimonial statement. 
Therefore, appellant has no right to cross-examine the dog and his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was not violated.”). 
159.  See, e.g., Carroll, 710 F.2d at 168 n.1; State v. Streeper, 747 P.2d 71, 75 
(Idaho 1987); State v. Davis, 97 So. 449, 454 (La. 1923); State v. Wanczyk, 482 
A.2d 964, 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1984); People v. Centolella, 305 
N.Y.S.2d 279, 282 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1969); Commonwealth v. Michaux, 520 A.2d 
1177, 1181-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); State v. Bostick, 169 S.E.2d 608, 610 (S.C. 
1969); cf. Terrell v. State, 239 A.2d 128, 136-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) 
(concluding that the accused has an opportunity to confront his accuser because 
the handler is merely testifying to his or her observations); State v. Storm, 238 
P.2d 1161, 1186 (Mont. 1951) (Angstman, J., dissenting) (“It is an erroneous 
notion to regard the hounds as witnesses . . . . The witness is the trainer of the 
dogs and defendant’s constitutional rights are protected and preserved by the 
right to cross-examine the owner and trainer of the dogs.”) (citations omitted); 
State v. Brown, 88 S.E. 21, 23 (S.C. 1916) (not expressly addressing the 
Confrontation Clause, but concluding that “[t]he dog is not the witness”).  
160.  See, e.g., State v. Dickerson, 82 N.E. 969, 974-76 (Ohio 1907) (stating 
approvingly that “the dogs were not witnesses whom the accused had a right to 
confront at the trial, in any different sense than the tracks of a man accused may 
be described as to form, size, or any other characteristic by which he may be 
identified”); Keodara, 128 Wash. App. at 2 (“[The tracking canine] was not a 
‘declarant’ for purposes of [the defendant]’s right to confront witnesses.”); see 
generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth 
of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15, 112-13 (1990) (collecting cases). 
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however, courts have accrued some dissenters, who have argued 
that the dog is the real witness, or even an inherently mute expert 
witness.161 
Courts often emphasize, or even require, the presence of 
the handler’s or trainer’s testimony at trial in rejecting 
Confrontation Clause challenges.162 As a practical matter, the 
handler’s testimony is also necessary in most cases because, absent 
the handler’s testimony, there is no evidence of the dog’s alert.163 
The handler’s testimony is also important because the actions of 
the handler can alter the results produced by the canine; in other 
words, the subtle (or intentional) cues of the handler can shape (or 
direct) the dog’s tracking and alerts.164 
Courts have frequently debated the appropriate 
circumstances in which canine tracking or alert evidence should be 
                                            
161.  See, e.g., State v. Davis, 97 So. 449, 457 (La. 1923) (O’Niell, J., 
dissenting) (“The ruling that [bloodhound] evidence is admissible . . . is violative 
of the fundamental right of an accused person to be faced by and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. . . . [T]he idea that the bloodhound does not 
testify is only skin-deep. The bloodhound, in such case, is a supposed expert 
witness, who cannot give any reason for his expert opinion . . . .”); see also 
Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W. 143, 146-47 (Ky. 1898) (Guffy, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (addressing canine evidence and noting the 
inability to cross-examine the dog, who in reality is the witness); State v. Grba, 
194 N.W. 250, 259 (Iowa 1923) (“[Canine] evidence is in the nature of expert 
testimony with no opportunity whatever to cross-examine the expert or find out 
from any source any reason for the conduct of the dogs . . . .”), overruled by 
State v. Buller, 517 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1994); cf. Brott v. State, 97 N.W. 593, 594 
(Neb. 1903) (rejecting canine evidence on general evidentiary principles). 
162.  See, e.g., Davis, 97 So. at 454 (“[S]uch evidence is not inadmissible on 
the ground that the dog is the witness and cannot be cross-examined, since it is 
the human testimony which makes the trailing done by the animal competent, 
and the defendant was confronted by the witnesses to such testimony . . . .”); cf. 
Terrell, 239 A.2d at 136-37 (“The trainer should be questioned to see if the dog 
was properly trained and the trail followed correctly . . . . It is the trainer who 
controls the dog, therefore, he should be the one to be examined and cross-
examined.”); State v. Barger, 612 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) 
(“The inability of the defendant to cross-examine the dog is not considered 
prejudicial, so long as its owner, trainer, or handler is made available for 
examination as to the dog’s general qualifications and specific activities on the 
day in question.”); Wanczyk, 482 A.2d at 967 (describing items the handler at 
issue would have to testify about). 
163.  But see Starkes v. United States, 427 A.2d 437, 439 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(noting that, in addition to the tracker’s testimony, an onlooker testified at trial 
that he saw the dog—as it was tracking the trail—arrive at the location and 
identify the area in question). 
164.  State v. Brown, 88 S.E. 21, 23 (S.C. 1916) (“This control of the animal, 
that is supposed to have the instinct, by the man, who has not the instinct, 
destroys any value it may have as evidence . . . .”). 
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used. Although much of this debate has centered on the Fourth 
Amendment question of when a dog’s alert is sufficient to create 
probable cause or otherwise be introduced as evidence to support 
a search,165 the issue has also arisen under a more general 
evidentiary posture.166 Courts have required various showings to 
support canine evidence, including the following considerations: 
whether the dog actually possessed the ability at issue (to track or 
alert to certain circumstances); whether the dog is a pure blood of 
a stock characterized by acute scent and discernment; the dog’s 
accuracy record in the field and in controlled tests; the dog 
handler’s experience and training; and the circumstances of the 
alert/tracking (weather, was the track fresh, did other scents 
contaminate the area, handler actions during the dog’s 
investigation, etc.).167 Finally, in rejecting Confrontation Clause and 
related claims, courts have also expressly compared canine 
evidence to other items that cannot be cross-examined, such as 
scientific instruments168 and photographs.169 
V. POTENTIAL MODELS FOR MACHINE-GENERATED SPEECH 
As Part III described, many courts have accepted the 
proposition that data generated by a machine: (1) is the statement 
of the machine only, (2) is not testimonial, and (3) for either or 
both of those reasons, such data does not trigger a right to confront 
and cross-examine humans involved, such as the machine’s 
                                            
165.  See generally Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (addressing 
whether a drug-detection dog’s alert created probable cause for a warrantless 
search of a vehicle). 
166.  See, e.g., Streeper, 747 P.2d at 75 (Idaho 1987) (rejecting a 
Confrontation Clause challenge to canine evidence but describing certain 
foundational requirements for such evidence); Terrell, 239 A.2d at 130 
(addressing whether the evidence of tracking by a police dog was properly 
admitted into evidence and, as a separate issue, whether there was probable 
cause to arrest). 
167.   See, e.g., Starkes, 427 A.2d at 439; Streeper, 747 P.2d at 75-76; State v. 
White, 642 S.E.2d 607, 614-15 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (collecting cases), aff’d but 
criticized, 676 S.E.2d 684 (2009); People v. Centolella, 305 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1969); see also Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (addressing dog-
tracking); see generally 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1026 (2014) (addressing dog-
tracking evidence, foundation requirements, and collecting cases). 
168.  See, e.g., Centolella, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 282 (“The animals are not 
witnesses against a defendant any more than a microscope or a spectograph.”). 
169.  See, e.g., Starkes, 427 A.2d at 440 (“With respect to appellant’s 
observation that the dog could not be cross-examined, we point out that other 
demonstrative evidence such as photographs and exhibits also cannot be cross-
examined.”). 
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operator. As Part IV revealed, that result is consistent with the 
treatment of photographs and videos, but somewhat inconsistent 
with courts’ treatment of canine evidence where the handler is 
considered the declarant and the right to confront and cross-
examine him or her is seen as important. In this final Part of the 
Article, we consider those results, along with the interpreter cases, 
in terms of how they align with the post-Crawford world. In doing 
so, this Part begins with less complex areas and then continues 
across the spectrum to areas that are more debatable and divisive.  
Whatever analytical model is adopted for machine-
generated evidence, it should be able to address the wide variety 
of machines that produce potential evidence because they all 
present fundamentally the same question: who is speaking, the 
operator, the machine, those involved in the machine’s creation 
and maintenance, or some combination of these? The list of 
machines that generate potential evidence is vast and includes gas 
chromatographs, fingerprint databases, digital scales, breathalyzers, 
GPS and other location data, software that logs actions, 
thermometers, photocopies, cash registers, TASERs, photographs 
and videos, and a host of other data-generating devices.170 Thus, 
the description herein, though using some machine types as 
examples, is intentionally machine-agnostic. Developing a model 
for this broad range of machines involves two key questions that 
have animated the majority of cases adopting the machine-
generated testimony doctrine: (1) does data generated by a 
machine involve an entity that falls within the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause; and (2) if so, is machine-generated data 
testimonial? We now turn to those questions. 
A. Lab Certifications, Affidavits, and Formal Reports 
“We already know that the government may not introduce 
forensic laboratory reports or affidavits reporting the results of 
                                            
170.   Examples of cases involving many of these machines are cited in Parts 
III and IV, supra. See also State v. Jennings, 9 A.3d 446, 457 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2011) (cash register receipt that reported the value of 101 DVDs defendant was 
alleged to have attempted to steal); Ethridge v. State, No. 12-09-00190-CR, 2012 
WL 1379648, at *18 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2012) (photocopy of an allegedly 
forged check; the defendant might have been arguing that the writings on the 
forged check were testimonial, but the court concluded that defendant’s 
argument was unclear, id. at *20); cf. Mathews v. Broce, No. 5:11-CV-133 MTT, 
2012 WL 3527073, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2012) (hearsay challenge to data 
stored on a TASER about the gun’s use on a suspect); Merritt Baer, Who Is the 
Witness to an Internet Crime: The Confrontation Clause, Digital Forensics, and 
Child Pornography, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 48 (2013). 
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forensic tests and use them as substantive evidence against a 
defendant unless the analyst who prepared or certified the report is 
offered as a live witness subject to cross-examination.”171 The key 
attribute for this category is that a person has asserted something in 
that report or affidavit. Similarly, when certifications attached to 
data are at issue—such as when an analyst asserts that the data was 
produced after adherence to certain protocols—courts should deem 
those assertions testimonial.  
It is also clear that the hearsay rules, though relevant to the 
inquiry, do not directly define the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause.172 For example, business records are not nontestimonial 
merely because they fall within the business records provision.173 
Similarly, courts should conclude that the fact that the modern 
definition of hearsay in rule 801 is a statement made by “a 
person”174does not restrict the Confrontation Clause to 
“person[s].”175  
However, the Confrontation Clause itself arguably imposes 
that restriction. It is debatable whether the intended scope of the 
Confrontation Clause encompassed machine-generated data given 
the limited technology available at and around the time of the 
Clause’s adoption (which included the thermometer and some 
other assertive tools).176 However, unless the Confrontation Clause 
                                            
171.   United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis 
added) (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011); 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (reviewing for plain 
error)). 
172.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (“Where testimonial 
statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth 
Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to 
amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”). 
173.  Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324 (“Business and public records are 
generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an 
exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created for the 
administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”).  
174.  FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (“‘Statement’ means a person’s oral assertion, 
written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an 
assertion.”). 
175.  But see United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(appearing to define the scope of the Confrontation Clause based on the 
definition of hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence).  
176.  See also Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert 
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 155 n.142 
(2012) (“Arguably, testimony relying on distributed cognition [which is a 
hallmark of science] is a modern phenomenon without clear Founding-era 
equivalents.”). 
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is reimagined to provide a different sort of “confrontation” or 
“cross-examination,” statements made purely by machines do not 
fall within either practice’s current implementation because you 
cannot cross-examine a machine. Nor do machines themselves 
meet the other requirements of Crawford et al.: they do not create 
data with any primary purpose of their own, they do not act under 
oath or solemnly in the traditional understandings of those terms, 
and even concepts of their availability would be strained.177 This 
Article proceeds on the premise that there is no right to cross-
examine a machine and, thus, that statements made solely by 
machines do not trigger a cross-examination right.178 
B. Humans Communicating Through or About Machines 
Moving down the spectrum, we encounter humans 
communicating through machines, such as through word 
processors, text messages, video- or audio-recorded interviews, and 
the like. The machine-generated testimony doctrine should not 
mean that information is deemed “machine-generated” merely 
because a machine was used in its maintenance, provision, or 
creation.179 This is important for both definitional reasons and 
because of the significant difference in treatment that machine-
generated and human-generated evidence receive in the eyes of 
many courts. 
For example, if a historical record, such as of past driving 
infractions, is typed into a database by humans, the print-out of 
that record does not become “machine-generated” merely because 
the machine (a printer) literally generated it.180 The underlying 
                                            
177.  See, e.g., Erick J. Poorbaugh, Interfacing Your Accuser: Computerized 
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause Following Melendez-Diaz, 23 REGENT 
U. L. REV. 213, 224-25 (2011) (contemplating whether “‘things’ can speak for 
themselves”) (capitalization omitted). 
178.  It would be possible to reimagine the Confrontation Clause to provide 
a right to confront and cross-examine a machine. That approach may be the 
best way to apply the Confrontation Clause to the modern world. The issue is 
briefly addressed in the final portions of this Article, but it is a topic that requires 
separate discussion. 
179.  Cf. United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1268 n.25 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(“[N]o one can seriously doubt the proposition that this opinion itself is a wholly 
human-generated statement, despite the fact that a machine—a word processor 
on a computer—aided its production.”). 
180.  But see Commonwealth v. Carter, 80 Va. Cir. 527, 534 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
2010) (concluding that a transcript of driving records that were entered by DMV 
clerks was not the statement of a witness because it was “generated by a 
machine and presented without human analysis or interpretation”). The 
transcript was also excluded because, inter alia, it was not created in anticipation 
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data entry of the humans is still a “statement” by the clerks who 
typed it in, and thus would be subject to the normal requirements 
of the Confrontation Clause. Similarly, if Cobham181 had 
(anachronisms aside) typed his accusatory letter and printed it out, 
it would not become the statement of the printer; it would remain 
Cobham’s accusations, communicated through the machine. In 
other words, the machine did not create the contents, a human 
did; the machine merely reported human input.182 
Similarly, if an analyst writes down content displayed on a 
machine or other facts about what the machine did before, during, 
or after testing (the noises it made, error lights that did or did not 
illuminate, etc.), that process would transform the machine-
generated data into a human’s assertion about what that data was, 
which would be subject to the Confrontation Clause (if testimonial) 
just like a witness repeating what color the traffic light was when a 
drunk driver ran it, or a police officer repeating an eye witness’s 
alleged description of the perpetrator.  
For example, in Robertson v. Commonwealth, a customer 
tried to steal several items.183 A store manager directed an 
employee to use a register’s scanner to find the prices of the 
items.184 The employee scanned the items, looked at the price 
displayed on the register, and wrote a list of the prices.185 In that 
situation, the prices displayed by the register were statements by 
the machine, but the handwritten list was the statement of the 
human operator.186  
                                            
of a trial but instead for normal DMV purposes, such as issuing licenses and tax 
assessments. 
181.  See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004) (“Lord 
Cobham, [a historical defendant]’s alleged accomplice, had implicated [that 
defendant] in an examination before the Privy Council and in a letter. At . . . 
trial, these were read to the jury.”). 
182.  See, e.g., John C. O’Brien, The Hearsay Within Confrontation, 29 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 501, 521 (2010) (making a similar observation); cf. 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:13 (4th ed. 2014) 
(“Sometimes the output of machines is a direct and obvious reflection of human 
assertions or input, such as conversations captured by recording devices, 
printouts of business data, and the content of websites. In these settings, ordinary 
hearsay analysis is appropriate.”). 
183.  Robertson v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 531, 532-33 (Va. Ct. App. 
2013) (en banc). 
184.  Id. at 533. 
185.  Id. 
186.  The court concluded that the list, which was admitted at trial, was also 
a statement by the manager who oversaw the scanning and testified at trial. Id. 
at 537. 
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Also falling in this area are statements about labels attached 
to raw data. For example, if an analyst types in a defendant’s 
name, sample number, or testing purpose, those entries are the 
analyst’s statements. Some of them might also be testimonial, 
depending on the circumstances. They are not, however, 
statements of the machine just because the machine included them 
with the raw data the machine printed. Similarly, if a human types 
data into a machine and that machine generates a barcode, RFID 
tag,187 or other digital marker, the data (now in barcode or other 
such form) does not become machine-generated when a second 
machine learns the relevant information via the barcode and prints 
out that data. A barcode or digital encoding of the defendant’s 
name, sample number, etc., is still a statement by whoever typed 
that information into the machine that generated the barcode.  
To illustrate this example, imagine that analyst Y wrote 
down in English the purpose for which a sample was to be tested, 
and analyst X translated it into Spanish. We would not say that the 
Spanish version is entirely the statement of X; it would remain, at 
least in part (depending on the court’s theory of the interpreter’s 
role), the statement of Y. So, too, when a machine translates the 
analyst-entered defendant’s name, sample number, testing purpose, 
etc., into a computer language like a barcode. When a subsequent 
machine translates the barcode back into English (or whatever 
language) and includes it on the print-out of raw data, it is still, in 
part, the statement of the human analyst who initially entered it.  
In these situations, the machine-generated testimony 
doctrine should be inapplicable because humans generated the 
relevant statements and machines merely repeated them. Some 
such statements might not be testimonial, as in the case of driving 
infractions recorded by the DMV for non-criminal purposes. Other 
statements, like Cobham’s, will fall within the heart of the 
Confrontation Clause. But because, in the eyes of some courts, 
statements generated by a machine do not trigger Confrontation 
Clause rights—but human-generated statements do—it is significant 
whether the words are attributed to a human author. 
 
                                            
187.  A radio-frequency identification (“RFID”) tag is a device used to 
identify and track things through the use of radio waves. See, e.g., RFID 
Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/rfid (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2014); see also RFID Tag Definition, PC Magazine, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/56955/rfid-tag (last visited Oct. 5, 
2014). 
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C. Automated Machines and Progenitors 
As a result of technological advancements, numerous data-
generating machines act without a human operator. Digital 
thermometers and weather stations track temperature and 
humidity, license plate scanners record vehicle plates, GPS and 
other motion-tracking devices log movement, and online software 
such as Google’s Content ID continuously patrol videos uploaded 
to YouTube.com for copyright infringement.188 This data can be 
vital in criminal trials: unusually high temperatures (from grow 
lights) may reveal a location where drugs are grown, license plates 
may reveal stolen cars, GPS logs may contradict alibis, and 
evidence of video uploads may be relevant in criminal proceedings 
for copyright matters.  
The salient point for our purposes is not whether these 
particular devices do or do not require operator input in their day-
to-day operation (a question that may vary from machine to 
machine). There are numerous machines that now—once built, 
programmed, and set in motion by a human—require only, at 
most, occasional oversight. The rest of the time, the machines do 
what they do without a human’s touch. For these machines, given 
the lack of contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous human 
involvement in generating the data, that data should be treated as 
the machine’s “statements.” 
We must still consider, however, the fact that people build 
machines, program them, and set them in motion. A machine that 
operates on its own and generates data about a target is only 
carrying out the analysis that the inventor, manufacturer, and 
programmer created it to undertake.189 Those individuals, the 
machine’s “progenitors,” built the machine to make assertions of 
fact. The machine’s ultimate assertions could be viewed as the 
                                            
188.   See, e.g., License Plate Reader: LPR-HR, PERCEPTICS, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/Article/data_driven_latest_highway_techno
logy_speeds_up_info_gathering_but_critics/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2014) 
(describing a license plate reader model with “95+% guaranteed read rate” that is 
“capable of reading all plate types day or night and in any kind of weather” to 
“capture state, province or country of origin ID”); How Content ID Works, 
GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370 (last visited Aug. 
12, 2014) (describing the Content ID copyright infringement detection system). 
189.  Cf. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:13 
(4th ed. 2014) (“A moment’s reflection leads to the conclusion that information 
produced by machines is, at one remove or many, a reflection of human design, 
engineering, programming, calibration, and purposeful input, all aimed at 
generating machine output. Hence machine-generated information is a 
legitimate concern of the hearsay doctrine.”). 
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assertions of those progenitors because they set the machine in 
motion for that specific primary purpose: to make assertions on the 
progenitors’ behalf. In other areas of the law, courts attribute the 
actions of machines to the humans who built them (e.g. product 
liability) or operate them (e.g. copyright in a photograph); the 
same could be true for the Confrontation Clause. A GC-MS (a 
common forensic machine), for example, is built to make 
assertions. Essentially, it is designed to assert what the sample it 
tested is made of.190 When a GC-MS produces data, it is only 
following instructions specified by human agents to do what it was 
made to do, assert things; but for the existence of the GC-MS, 
humans might have made those same (or at least similar) assertions 
by recording the results of a chemical analysis they conducted.  
Is the GC-MS truly speaking on its own? Machines can 
produce data in a variety of forms—graphical print-outs, electronic 
records and so on—but the machines are, in some form, only the 
last link in a long line of instructions given by human actors. Just as 
we attribute a photograph to the photographer and liability in 
some product liability cases to the manufacturer, we could attribute 
an assertive machine’s data to the human progenitors. It is the 
progenitors’ contributions and instructions that enabled the 
machine to make the assertions. 
However, our fifth-grade grammar teacher did the same 
thing for each of us, as did other teachers, our parents, and so 
forth. A request to call any of them to the stand under the 
Confrontation Clause—based on their contributions to our ability to 
speak and accuse someone—would be futile. Although a machine, 
unlike each of us, has no choice but to follow the instructions it 
was given, the machine’s progenitor gave that machine only 
general training about how to make assertions, not specific 
instructions about what to assert for a particular sample. The 
progenitors also provided only the potential to make assertions; the 
machine makes that assertion without the progenitor knowing 
anything about the tested samples. In these ways, though a 
machine “learns” and follows instructions in a different way than 
we do, the machine is not merely the mouthpiece for its 
progenitors as to a particular assertion for a particular sample. 
When a browser returns search results from, say, Bing.com, it 
                                            
190.  For a simplified explanation of how a GC-MS functions, see GCSE 
Bitesize: Analyzing Substances, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/ 
science/add_aqa/atomic_structure/analysing_substancerev2.shtml (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2014).  
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would be anomalous to consider the results as the assertions also of 
Bill Gates, one of the search engine’s innumerable progenitors.  
For these reasons, courts could reject the request to call 
manufacturers and engineers to the stand on the theory that they 
designed, built, and programmed the scale that ultimately 
displayed the weight of the cocaine the suspect had in his pocket. 
Courts could conclude that these contributions are not assertions in 
the sense of the Confrontation Clause nor are the progenitors 
“witnesses” within the Clause’s meaning—their contribution to the 
real assertion, the machine’s data, is too remote.191 That result 
makes sense. 
As a practical matter, for most machines, the progenitors 
also would not be a collection of speakers but a chorus of dozens, 
if not hundreds and thousands, of manufacturers, designers, 
programmers, technicians, managers, etc. The Supreme Court has 
already indicated that it is not necessary to call innumerable 
witnesses to the stand in the context of forensic assertions,192 and 
other courts have been loath to require the testimony of multiple 
people involved in the chain of custody or maintenance of 
machines.193 Significant practical difficulties would arise in any 
attempt to call dozens or more progenitors to testify as contributors 
to a machine’s data.  
We can also reach that same result another way, both for 
grammar teachers and machine progenitors: even assuming that 
progenitors do make assertions through machines in a sense that 
triggers the Confrontation Clause, those inventors, manufacturers, 
and programmers usually will not have “spoken” in a way that is 
testimonial.194 Under the traditional test for what is testimonial, 
                                            
191.  A distinction could be made for assertive machines—machines made to 
advance claims about aspects of reality. Where a machine is designed for the 
primary purpose of making assertions about reality, a court could, theoretically, 
carve out an exception to the Confrontation Clause. It is unclear where this 
exception would be grounded in the text of the Confrontation Clause, however. 
192.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009) (“[W]e 
do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant 
in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of 
the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case.”). 
193.  See infra pp. 44-45. 
194.  Cf. Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert 
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 151-52 (2012) 
(“The operator of a breathalyzer relies upon a machine he himself likely only 
partly understands—enormous technical knowledge is literally built into it. But 
that knowledge is not testimonial under any of the Court's definitions.”); John C. 
O’Brien, The Hearsay Within Confrontation, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 501, 
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described in Davis, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming, the 
progenitors have not acted with a primary purpose of creating 
evidence for a trial. When they built the machine, there was no 
specific trial to contemplate, nor was there even a specific crime, 
victim, or defendant at issue (identified or otherwise). Though the 
machines might—if actually purchased and used—produce evidence 
for a trial, they might instead be used for a variety of purposes 
other than to produce evidence for a criminal trial. Purely 
hypothetical future trials and crimes do not satisfy the “testimonial” 
requirement. 
Williams should not change that analysis because, though 
there is a grain of accuracy in the plurality’s test for what is 
testimonial, it is only a grain. In Williams, part of the disagreement 
between the plurality and the other justices was the plurality’s 
adoption of a definition of testimonial that required that the 
statement have “the primary purpose of accusing a targeted 
individual.”195 Five other justices rejected this test in no uncertain 
terms.196 The dissent’s position is the better-reasoned analysis in 
this regard because the important question is whether there is a 
non-hypothetical trial or crime at hand, not an identified 
perpetrator. First, the plurality’s test was not as target-agnostic as 
those justices suggested: the profile that would result from testing a 
DNA sample that was from a rape case obviously can, and 
hopefully will, incriminate someone. There is a clear target (the 
unknown person from whom the sample derives), a crime has 
occurred and is being investigated, and a trial is not only 
hypothetically possible but actually in the investigatory stages. That 
targeting is not theoretical: the analysts are running tests on a 
targeted biological sample to extract, hopefully, the perpetrator’s 
DNA. 
Second, the plurality’s analysis assumes the targetless nature 
of the test (and accompanying quality of the analyst), and that 
assumption directly undermines a key rationale behind the 
Confrontation Clause—giving the defendant and the fact finder a 
chance to assess the declarant. Courts generally will not know 
                                            
516 (2010) (noting that a “declarant’s lack of an intent to assert [a] matter sought 
to be proved seems totally at odds with the concept of a testimonial statement”). 
195.  Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2243 (2012) (plurality) (emphasis 
added). See also id. at 2243-44 (“Similarly, no one at Cellmark could have 
possibly known that the profile that it produced would turn out to inculpate 
petitioner—or for that matter, anyone else whose DNA profile was in a law 
enforcement database.”).  
196.  Id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2273-74 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
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whether the analyst has fabricated the result or framed the 
defendant, which is unlikely.197 In either of those situations, the 
analyst who created the underlying profile has targeted someone, 
for whatever reasons, and not only knows but apparently intends 
the resulting profile to be potential evidence in a future trial. In 
other words, in the case of intentional sample contamination or 
drylabbing,198 the analyst has selected a target to incriminate. By 
assuming otherwise, the plurality deprives the defendant of the 
chance to cross-examine that analyst; there is no certainty that 
cross-examination will reveal the malfeasance,199 but it sometimes 
does200 and, in any event, the chance to do so is why the 
Confrontation Clause exists. 
The plurality might (correctly) respond to this observation 
by noting that the primary purpose analysis is “an objective test” in 
which the court “look[s] for the primary purpose that a reasonable 
person would have ascribed to the statement, taking into account 
all of the surrounding circumstances.”201 It is not focused on 
whether the analyst at issue actually did or did not fabricate the 
results and target someone. Would a reasonable person assume 
that a lab result was not fabricated? A reasonable person would 
know of the numerous forensic lab scandals, including dry-lab and 
fabrication incidents.202 In light of those scandals and the reality 
that analysts do select targets in some cases, a reasonable person 
should answer that it is unclear whether the primary purpose of the 
analyst was to accuse a targeted individual. Further, because there 
is a non-hypothetical defendant (the sample tested came from a 
rape kit), a reasonable person would recognize that the test is 
targeting someone; the analyst (if he or she is honest and not fixing 
the results) simply does not know who.  
                                            
197.  See, e.g., supra note 7 (addressing examples of fabricated work, lab 
errors, and similar incidents). 
198.  See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.305, 319 (2009) 
(noting that “‘drylabbing’ [is] where forensic analysts report results of tests that 
were never performed”) (citation omitted). 
199.  See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2250 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In the 
wrongful-conviction cases to which this Court has previously referred, the 
forensic experts all testified in court and were available for cross-examination 
[yet admission of the faulty evidence was not prevented].”). 
200.  Id. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting such an example); id. at 
2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (same). 
201.  Id. at 2243 (citing Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011)). 
202.  See, e.g., note 7. 
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For these reasons, the definitions of “testimonial” found in 
Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and the other post-Crawford cases203 
should be followed by the lower courts, which should reject the 
requirement in Williams that the analyst must have targeted a 
known individual. Instead, courts should adopt a requirement that 
the data targeted someone generally, such as when a witness 
describes facts about a getaway car, gives a description of the 
defendant that the witness does not personally know, or when a 
dog tracks a scent of an unidentified perpetrator. That test should 
be deemed satisfied when there is a targeted sample from a known 
or suspected crime because the point of testing such a sample is to 
see whom the results might incriminate. 
Applying that test to machine progenitors, courts should 
conclude that the progenitors’ contribution to the test result is not 
testimonial. The progenitors of most machines will have designed, 
built, and programmed them with no crime, specific sample, or 
specific criminal trial in mind. In other words, their work will be, at 
best, in anticipation of hypothetical future criminal trials. Thus, 
courts should conclude that machine progenitors contribute to the 
“speech” of a machine in a way that is too attenuated under the 
Confrontation Clause and, in any event, is also not testimonial. 
Progenitors are normally not covered by the Confrontation Clause. 
It is not hard to imagine exceptions to those general rules. 
If a machine or software was designed, programmed, or otherwise 
calibrated to investigate a particular event or entity, that could be a 
formal action undertaken with the primary purpose of generating 
evidence and thus could be considered testimonial. If the 
progenitor’s contribution to the machine’s output was also so 
significant that the progenitor was essentially a co-author of the 
results, that could subject the progenitor to cross-examination. In 
the next two sections, that question is addressed directly: when, if 
ever, is a human’s contribution (whether from a progenitor or the 
machine’s operator) to a machine’s data sufficient to subject the 
human to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause? 
D. Maintenance and Calibration Records 
Maintenance and calibration records fall in the portion of 
the spectrum in which humans play an active role in the day-to-day 
operation of machines, but where courts should still have no 
                                            
203.  See also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (describing 
the test as whether the statement was for “a primary purpose of creating an out-
of-court substitute for trial testimony”). 
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difficulty concluding that they generally are not subject to the 
Confrontation Clause. The first area in this range is records that 
establish that a particular machine has been inspected, calibrated, 
or otherwise maintained and found to be in proper working order. 
Though these records are made as formal assertions that would 
normally be used for their truth at trial, courts should conclude 
that they generally will not trigger a Confrontation Clause right 
because the statements in them are not testimonial.  
Many courts that have considered the issue have come to 
this conclusion.204 Maintenance and calibration records, when 
made as part of a routine process, are created “to ensure the 
reliability of such machines—not to secure evidence for use in any 
particular criminal proceeding. The fact that the scientific test 
results and the observations of the technicians might be relevant to 
future prosecutions of unknown defendants [is], at most, an 
ancillary consideration . . . .”205 This test might be clearer if the 
emphasized words were replaced with “non-hypothetical,” to 
clarify the test’s distance from the Williams particular-identified-
defendant requirement. The focus should be on whether there is 
an identifiable non-hypothetical use of the statement in a future 
criminal trial, not whether that use involves a specific, identified 
defendant.  
Applying that test, the creator of calibration and 
maintenance records can reasonably foresee that the records might 
be used in a future case, but the existence of the future case is 
purely hypothetical. No case yet exists as to the records being 
                                            
204.  See, e.g., Cranston v. State, 936 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“[T]his Court has routinely held that Datamaster inspection certificates are non-
testimonial documents presenting no confrontation problems of their own.”); 
Matthies v. State, 85 So. 3d 838, 844 (Miss.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 317 (2012) 
(concluding that most courts to consider the issue have held that inspection, 
maintenance, and calibration records are non-testimonial and collecting cases on 
that point); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 662 (N.J. 2014) (collecting cases); see 
also People v. Pealer, 985 N.E.2d 903, 908 (N.Y. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
105 (2013); People v. Hulbert, 939 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Dyarman, 73 A.3d 565, 569 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 948 (2014); John C. O'Brien, The Hearsay Within Confrontation, 29 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 501, 521 & n.155 (2010); cf. McCarthy v. State, 285 P.3d 
285, 294 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012) (Mannheimer, J., concurring) (collecting cases, 
but arguing that calibration results may actually be testimonial); People v. Doe, 
959 N.Y.S.2d 839, 844 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (analogizing the physical lifting of a 
fingerprint to machine maintenance and calibration records, which “do not 
violate a defendant’s Confrontation Rights”). 
205.  People v. Pealer, 985 N.E.2d 903, 907 (N.Y. 2013) (emphasis added), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 105 (2013). 
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created; as far as the record-creators know, there has been no 
report of a crime, no crime itself, no targeted sample, nor is there—
as connected to calibration or maintenance of the device—a victim, 
crime scene, or defendant.206 Because the records lack a non-
hypothetical target, they are not accusatorial or testimonial.207 
If, however, a technician were to calibrate or inspect a 
machine for a specific, non-hypothetical test, the result should 
change. Suppose, for example, that a police officer is about to 
conduct a breath test at the station and the officer asks the 
calibration technician to prepare the breathalyzer. In that situation, 
even if the technician does not know who the defendant is, the 
prosecutorial wheel has begun to turn and the technician knows it: 
there is an alleged crime, and future use is not hypothetical but 
instead planned. In that situation, a calibration record has both an 
evidentiary character (the device is about to accuse or exculpate a 
defendant based largely on the device’s proper calibration and 
maintenance) and “the primary purpose of the [creation of the 
record] is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.”208 The maintenance/calibration record 
would thus be testimonial. 
E. Humans Operating Machines: Placers, Preparers, and Button-Pushers 
Being testimonial is only part of the equation; the 
“statements” at issue must actually be subject to the Confrontation 
Clause. Are the progenitor’s programming and the technician’s 
calibration and maintenance properly encompassed by the 
Confrontation Clause, which is concerned with “witnesses” and 
those who “bear testimony” against the accused?209 In other words, 
is the data generated by a machine the “statement” of the machine, 
the humans involved contemporaneously in the creation of the 
statement, or both?  
                                            
206.  At any given time, there are presumably crimes that have not yet been 
identified or are about to be investigated. However, as to the primary purpose 
that the person is calibrating or maintaining the machine, there is no specific 
crime or victim at issue. The calibration and maintenance are for general use, 
not a specific future use. 
207.  See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 6.04(e) 
(Matthew Bender 5th ed. 2013) (noting that intoxilyzer calibration records 
created before a suspect is stopped, much less arrested, have a quality-control 
function). 
208.  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822; (2006); see also Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). 
209.  See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting 2 N. 
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1928)). 
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That question lies at the heart of the machine-generated 
testimony doctrine, and its answer is debatable. Though humans 
operate the machines (to varying extents), the machines often do 
the heavy lifting in creating the data. Given the machine’s 
significant, if not predominant, contribution to the resulting 
“statement”—the raw data—most courts have concluded that the 
machine is the speaker.210 And if the statements are attributed to 
only the machine, the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause 
presumably does not apply to them because you cannot, in the 
traditional sense, cross-examine or confront a machine.211  
However, there are approaches that would attribute some 
machine speech to their human assistants. In this section, we 
consider three such categories of machine-human pairings: (1) 
humans directing the machine at some specific target (a given 
sample, a specific area to be recorded, etc.), (2) individuals who 
collect and prepare a sample for later analysis, and (3) machines 
that produce data with little more than the push of a power or start 
button.  
Both this section and the next section address not just 
operators of machines, but also progenitors and technicians who 
create, program, calibrate, or maintain a machine for a specific 
anticipated use, such as designing software to infiltrate a particular 
network, or calibrating a breathalyzer for a specific, imminent 
breath test. In all of these situations, humans contribute to the 
imminent use of the machine to generate evidence and, in doing 
so, exercise control that, to varying degrees, dictates the 
“statement” that the machine will make.  
We begin with directing a machine to a specific sample or 
area for analysis. Suppose an analyst places a white rock taken 
from the defendant—which is suspected to be cocaine—in the 
testing machine. Another analyst sets the parameters and runs the 
test, and the machine provides data about the rock, but the 
machine did so only because someone provided the sample to the 
machine. Is directing the machine’s attention to the specific 
sample—but doing no more—an action that falls under the 
Confrontation Clause? 
Most likely not. These actions can be likened to any other 
physical action and are primarily non-assertive conduct that, 
despite impacting the resulting machine-generated data, are not 
within the ambit of the Confrontation Clause’s concern with 
                                            
210.  See supra Part III. 
211.  See United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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bearing testimony. Removing the machine from the picture 
simplifies the question: if one analyst gave a substance to a second 
analyst and, after testing via beakers and boilers, the second 
analyst declared that the substance was cocaine, we would not 
attribute that declaration of results to the first analyst.212 The same 
should be true for individuals providing samples to machines. In 
both situations, one person provides the sample to the testing entity 
(the second analyst or the automated machine); that action is non-
assertive conduct that is at least one step removed from the 
creation of the statement. Thus, courts should not attribute data to 
an individual who merely directs a machine’s attention to a 
sample. 
Further, when placing an item in a machine that requires 
additional action to display data, the analyst has not yet caused the 
machine to make any assertion. If further action is required, such 
as pushing the start button, it is the person who actually does so to 
whom the statement (arguably) would be attributed.213 In that way, 
the mere act of directing a machine’s attention at a sample, but 
doing no more, is akin to A handing B a sample for B to test. 
Accordingly, courts should reject the claim that the individuals 
who placed the sample in the machine (but did no more) are the 
co-authors of the raw data the machine produces. 
What about individuals who collect a sample from the 
crime scene or prepare the sample for analysis at a later time? 
They should not trigger a Confrontation Clause right because, if all 
they do is collect and prepare evidence, they have not made any 
assertions. They collect the sample or prepare it so someone else 
may make an assertion about it. If, however, the collectors and 
preparers create certificates or the equivalent in the course of 
collecting and preparing items, those statements may be 
testimonial and covered by the Clause. However, simply collecting 
and preparing evidence through physical actions does appear, on 
its face, to be assertive conduct.214 
                                            
212.  As indicated earlier in this Part, we might attribute other things to the 
first analyst, though. Suppose the first analyst wrote the defendant’s name on the 
evidence bag for the white rock. When the second analyst learns the defendant’s 
name from that bag and then repeats it in the second analyst’s report, we should 
attribute the statement in part to the first analyst. 
213.  If the machine displays data automatically, such as on a scale that 
automatically displays weight without further intervention, then that action is 
akin to the next category: operators who generate data by merely pushing the 
equivalent of a start button on a machine.  
214.  Cf. Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert 
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 152 (2012) 
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Whether that mere button-pusher should be deemed a co-
author of the machine’s statement is our final question in this 
section. In this category of machines, the operator’s contribution to 
the resulting raw data is limited to putting the sample in the 
machine (which we have already considered) and pushing start. In 
this situation, courts again are widely in agreement that the 
resulting data is a “statement” by the machine, which is not 
covered by the Confrontation Clause.215 
That result is consistent with the cases rejecting application 
of the Confrontation Clause to photographs, videos, and 
interpreters.216 If there is no right to cross-examine the person who 
pushed the camera’s start-button-equivalent (and potentially even 
made subjective decisions about angle, lighting, lens use, etc.), it 
would be incongruent if there were a right to cross-examine an 
analyst who pushed the start button on an automated forensic 
machine. Similarly, if there is no right to cross-examine an 
interpreter—who actually makes subjective decisions in 
translating217—why would there be a right to cross-examine an 
analyst who made no such decisions? 
The result also makes some intuitive sense: the operator 
exercises no control over the machine’s creation of data, and so 
the proper parties to be viewed as a co-author of the machine’s 
assertions are the machine’s progenitors—they exercised the 
relevant control over the machine’s speech, to which the operator 
contributed nothing. The progenitors are the source of the 
assertion, but their contribution is (as described previously) 
attenuated and nontestimonial. Though courts’ common references 
to the machine being the witness in such situations are technically 
incorrect—it would be better to say the progenitors are the ones 
making the assertion—the result is the same: no person making an 
assertion acted in a testimonial manner, and the machine (to 
whatever extent it is viewed as a separate entity from the 
progenitors, perhaps as a sum of the parts) is not subject to 
confrontation under Crawford. 
Finally, there are some instances where the operator’s 
contribution to the resulting assertion would not be testimonial. If a 
store manager installed a surveillance camera and aimed it at the 
                                            
(“[V]irtually no one who has thought about the intersection of forensic science 
and the Confrontation Clause thinks [calling, e.g., roughly a dozen analysts 
involved in a DNA test to testify] makes sense.”). 
215.  See supra Part III. 
216.  See supra Part IV. 
217.  See United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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cash register, the resulting videos would fall into this category: a 
machine, with little-to-no human interaction beyond the manager 
setting the machine in motion, would generate data. The 
manager’s initiation of the recording process would usually not be 
testimonial because, although the manager might intend to create 
evidence that could be used in a future trial (such as to catch a 
future robber), he or she would not have a non-hypothetical use in 
mind (unless there was, for instance, a recent history of cash 
register shortages the manager specifically intended to catch). Even 
assuming that the manager did have an evidence-generation 
purpose in mind, setting up a camera in your own store is arguably 
not sufficiently formal or solemn to be testimonial (especially in 
Justice Thomas’s eyes). Thus, the resulting video feed should be 
deemed neither the statement of the manager who installed it nor 
testimonial. Courts are on defensible ground in concluding that 
data produced by a human operator that essentially pushed a 
“start” button is immune from the Clause’s requirements of 
confrontation and cross-examination.  
This result renders a significant number of machines 
immune to the Confrontation Clause. For all machines that are 
sufficiently automated that the operator need only push start, there 
will be no right to confront or cross-examine that operator nor, for 
the reasons discussed earlier, most anyone else involved at a prior 
stage. 
F. Humans Operating Machines: Humans Exercising Control 
All that remains is the category of machines where there is 
some level of human control beyond simply setting the device in 
motion. This area poses the most difficult Confrontation Clause 
questions for machine-generated data. Through selecting the 
parameters of the test, choosing how the data will be displayed, 
and controlling the machine in other ways, some operators greatly 
shape the assertion the machine will make. Thus, courts could 
consider the machine and operator as co-authors of the resulting 
statement. Just as an interpreter’s translations are often attributed to 
the defendant and a dog’s handler is seen as the key witness for a 
dog’s alert,218 so too—either as a matter of logic or as a legal 
fiction—could a machine’s data be attributed to its handlers (or 
otherwise require their testimony). Progenitors, calibrators, and 
maintenance technicians who prepare a device for a specific 
                                            
218.  See infra pp. 57-58. However, as discussed later in this Part, it is 
somewhat problematic to rely on these other doctrines. 
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investigation could be placed in this same category because they 
similarly shape a machine’s data by preparing the machine for a 
specific, non-hypothetical use.  
On the other hand, choosing the parameters of the test, 
selecting the way the data will be displayed, and other such actions 
are physical actions that, viewed in isolation, will often be non-
assertive conduct. Why should non-assertive conduct that creates—
but does not define the contents of—assertions be attributed to the 
non-assertive actor? Given that the machine or its progenitors 
define the contents of the assertion, courts could conclude that they 
are the only declarant, not the human operator. Courts are on 
strong ground in reaching this alternative conclusion, and they 
could draw support from the photo, video, and interpreter cases in 
rejecting a right to confront the machine’s operator.  
At the heart of the debate between these two dueling 
conclusions is the determination of whether controlling a machine 
for the purpose of making an assertion—but via actions that are 
themselves non-assertive—exposes human assistants to the 
Confrontation Clause. The amount of control the human assistant 
exercises will vary from machine to machine, and the amount of 
control is important: if the operator is not exercising “sufficient” 
control, attributing the assertion to the operator would be solely a 
fiction. However, where operating decisions are made by a human 
controller and are made for the express purpose of generating an 
assertion, the resulting assertion could be attributed, in part, to the 
operator. The human is, after all, using the machine for that 
express purpose: to generate an assertion about the sample. On 
that basis, courts could view that resulting assertion (the data) as 
partially attributable to the human. The statement is also partially 
the machine’s. But, because the statement is partially attributable to 
the human assistant, the defendant would have a right to confront 
and cross-examine that individual. 
It is difficult to compare this model to examples outside the 
machine-generated phenomenon. If Carl, through threats and 
extortion, coerced Dan not to tell police anything about Carl’s 
involvement in a crime, Carl would be exercising some control 
over Dan. When Dan gave a statement to the police, if we knew 
that Dan was altering the story because of the threat, we might 
consider Dan’s statement as partially a product of Carl’s control—as 
partially attributable to Carl speaking through Dan even though 
Dan has not repeated any of Carl’s statements. But it is doubtful 
that a defendant would have a right to cross-examine Carl just 
because Dan subsequently told a story that Carl influenced. In this 
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example, that lack of a right to cross-examine Carl is only 
strengthened by the fact that Carl did not tell Dan what specific 
story to tell, and thus many of the details in the resulting story were 
not directly shaped by Carl. Dan also exercised his own judgment 
in deciding whether to obey Carl’s orders. The lack of an ability to 
cross-examine Carl in this scenario might indicate that there is 
similarly no right to cross-examine a human assistant who merely 
shapes a machine’s data. 
But machines are much more affected by their controllers 
than Dan. If an operator decides to run one test or display results 
in one way, the machine generally cannot do otherwise. This is not 
a matter of whether the operator has made a good decision or bad 
decision, such as running the wrong test. Nor does it matter 
whether, at a later date, someone could look at the raw data and 
see that the incorrect test was run. What matters is that the story is 
not just the machine’s; the machine has yielded, and must yield, 
important decisions to the operator, and thus the resulting data is 
not solely the product of the machine (or those who manufactured 
and maintained it). In that situation, the raw data is at least in part 
the product of multiple authors, including the machine and the 
operator.219  
As another comparative exercise, operating the machine 
could be likened to interrogation because the operator, by either 
pushing start or setting the operating parameters, effectively asks 
the machine the question that prompts it to generate a statement in 
response. Just as an interrogator’s non-assertive question usually 
shapes the answer given, so too does the operator of a machine 
direct the machine, through non-assertive physical actions, towards 
a category of answers.220 However, in the context of a conversation 
or even an interrogation, though the question directs the 
declarant’s attention to a topic, the statement in response is still a 
distinct item. The question might need to be admitted as evidence 
for other reasons, such as to give proper context to the answer, but 
that does not make the question part of the answer. If the question 
to a witness is not part of the witness’s answer, it could be 
reasonable to view a “question” to the machine—setting the 
                                            
219.  As described earlier, the data is also the product of the progenitors 
and technicians who calibrated, maintained, etc., the device. Their contributions, 
however, will normally not be testimonial (and might be too attenuated to be 
deemed assertions). 
220.  As voice-recognition technology improves, analysts might even 
conduct forensic analysis by asking machines questions or giving them vocal 
commands. 
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operating parameters or pushing start—as not part of the machine’s 
answer either.  
On the other hand, unlike a declarant answering a question 
where the possible responses are limitless, a machine “chooses” its 
answer from a limited number of choices dictated by how the 
machine was programmed. In this sense, the machine is much 
more heavily influenced by the question the operator poses than is 
the person interrogated by a police officer. Further, it is debatable 
whether the answer given to a question (whether the answer comes 
from a machine or a person) is really separate from the question; 
the answer could be said to incorporate the question. If I ask you 
where you were at 5:00 p.m. on October 10th, your answer of “at 
the track” incorporates the question and is understood as “at 5:00 
p.m. on October 10th, I was at the track.”221 Similarly, the fairly 
leading question posed by some operators of machines could be 
said to be incorporated in the answer the machine gives. However, 
once again, it seems unlikely that a defendant would have the right 
to confront and cross-examine an interrogator who posed only 
non-assertive questions that shaped the declarant’s answers.222 
Though there is no perfect analog elsewhere in the Confrontation 
Clause for the work that a machine does, these exercises suggest 
that any attribution of the machine’s data to the human assistants 
would be rather sui generis (as with interpreters and dog handlers) 
and arguably a legal fiction.  
Adopting, for now, the proposition that this attribution is 
appropriate, how much operator control would be enough to 
trigger it? There are at least two different ways to fence-off this 
area: (1) humans exercising a certain threshold of control over the 
machine’s output, or (2) a standard requiring that humans make 
subjective decisions that affect the analysis. If subjective decision-
making is enough to deem the human a co-author of the machine’s 
raw data, then button-pushers may cross that threshold when they 
decide which machine or tool they will use to run the test. For 
example, if, hypothetically, a test using litmus paper would 
produce equivalent results to those produced by a machine that 
                                            
221.  Cf. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160-61 (2011) (“In many 
instances, the primary purpose of the interrogation will be most accurately 
ascertained by looking to the contents of both the questions and the answers. To 
give an extreme example, if the police say to a victim, ‘Tell us who did this to 
you so that we can arrest and prosecute them,’ the victim's response that ‘Rick 
did it,’ appears purely accusatory because by virtue of the phrasing of the 
question, the victim necessarily has prosecution in mind when she answers.”). 
222.  Cf. id. at 1160 n.11 (“An interrogator's questions, unlike a declarant's 
answers, do not assert the truth of any matter.”). 
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requires only the push of a button, deciding to use the machine 
over the litmus paper is a subjective decision about the analysis. 
Yet, for the reasons discussed previously, it is arguably problematic 
to attribute the raw data to the operator when the operator merely 
pushed start. Among other problems, the analyst has exercised no 
control over the analytical tool used, she has simply chosen which 
tool to “ask.” 
That problem is less significant if the test is whether the 
operator exercised a certain level of control over the machine’s 
output. Simply selecting a machine exercises no control over that 
machine’s assertion process; it exercises control over the data on 
the macro level, but not on the micro level as to that machine’s 
actual method of making the assertion. In other words, it might 
change the results, but not because it changes how the specific 
machine “speaks.” Similarly, those who prepare a sample exercise 
control over the resulting data, but they do not exercise control 
over the testing machine directly, which is used at a later step. 
Changing the sample before it reaches the machine, such as by 
contaminating it or swapping in a different substance, changes the 
right answer, and the machine (which is designed to give the 
answer that correctly mirrors reality, e.g., what the sample is 
actually made of) has changed its assertion accordingly. But it does 
not change how the machine makes that assertion. Thus, neither 
simply choosing a machine nor preparing a sample would be 
sufficient to deem the operator or preparer a co-author of the raw 
data.  
A control-based test also better models when a statement 
should be attributed to multiple sources: it is more reasonable to 
do so when one of the sources exercises control over the other’s 
statement than when one simply exercises subjective judgment that 
somehow affects the resulting statement. Further, focusing on 
control avoids another problem: if lab protocols or scientific 
principles specify how a test should be run, confusion could arise 
when following those pre-defined rules—would that be subjective 
decision-making by the analyst? 
Suppose, however, that a lab supervisor seeking to duck 
the threshold of a control test designated two GC-MS machines as 
“the GC-MS that operates at temperature X” and “the GC-MS for 
temperature Y.” Suppose also that selecting the temperature range 
used in a GC-MS is a decision that exercises sufficient control over 
the raw data to meet the control test. In that situation, an operator 
would choose the machine based on the preferred temperature, 
thereby exercising control over the data on the macro level, but 
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would fall short of the threshold for exercising control on the micro 
level (over the specific GC-MS’s analysis, which the analyst has not 
changed at all because each GC-MS is already set to use the 
desired parameter).  
That result is acceptable under the control test because the 
goal is not to artificially capture all machine data, but to capture 
only the data where the machine is not the only “speaker.” If I 
choose whether to ask a friend who is a staunch Democrat for 
advice on who to vote for instead of a friend who is a Republican, 
I have exercised (on the macro level) more than de minimis 
control over the answer I will receive even though I have exercised 
almost no control (on the micro level) over what the chosen friend 
will say. So, too, if I ask a former boss who fired me—instead of a 
former boss who promoted me—to write me a letter of 
recommendation. In these examples, as with choosing the 
“temperature Y” GC-MS over the “temperature X” GC-MS, the 
resulting speaker is not controlled, though the resulting data is.223  
To the extent that we might seek a way to address control 
over the data on the macro level, the Confrontation Clause—which 
asks who is the relevant declarant on the micro level—does not 
help. If it did—if the relevant question was “who is exercising 
sufficient control over the resulting data”—then the parties who 
cross that threshold would include individuals who are potentially 
several steps removed from the operator-analyst’s actual use of the 
machine. The list would include those who collected the evidence, 
others in the chain of custody, and individuals who prepared a 
sample for testing.224 That result is problematic for the reasons 
noted earlier in this Part, and it would also be in tension with the 
Court’s view of the Confrontation Clause in Melendez-Diaz.225 
                                            
223.  If the lab supervisor changed the parameters for the machines for a 
specific, non-hypothetical test, the result would change. In that situation, the 
supervisor would be a co-author by exercising control over a specific non-
hypothetical statement. By setting the GC-MS machines at fixed temperatures for 
all uses, the lab supervisor acts more like a calibrator than an operator because 
the supervisor is preparing the machines for foreseeable, but only hypothetical, 
use as opposed to any specific sample, investigation, or crime. 
224.  For example, Justice Breyer included a summary of DNA lab work 
preparation in Williams. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2245 (2012) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
225.  See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 
(“[W]e do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be 
relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or 
accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s 
case.”). 
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But how much control is enough? Should it be “more than 
de minimis” control? Substantial control? Some other threshold? A 
“more than de minimis” approach is a threshold that courts 
already use in other contexts, and it makes some sense to the 
extent that de minimis contributions by the operator-analyst do not 
shape the machine’s data, thereby leaving the machine/progenitors 
as the only declarant(s).226 However, that result would still require 
imprecise case-by-case testing for each machine, and the “de 
minimis” threshold answers the “how much is enough” question 
somewhat arbitrarily. Whatever the threshold is, it will raise 
difficult questions; for example, if an analyst selects the 
magnification level for an electron microscope’s printed images of 
a sample, is that enough control? Is choosing the unit of 
measurement, such as pounds instead of kilograms, de minimis?  
As an alternative approach, courts could look to the 
“language conduit” interpreter cases under one of several 
analogies. Just as there is no right to cross-examine the interpreter, 
who is merely a conduit through which language passes and is 
translated, so too would there be no right to cross-examine the 
operator, who is merely a conduit for the proper operation of the 
machine. Under that theory, courts would attribute to the machine 
the operator’s contribution in the same way that they attribute the 
interpreter’s contribution to the defendant. Alternatively, the 
sample could be viewed as continually asserting its properties in a 
language that requires translation (“My BAC is 10%.”), and the 
machine and operator would be merely a conduit for translating 
that information to a form that can be used in court. A DNA 
sample, for example, is already the defendant’s DNA profile or 
not; if we could perceive it in the way the translator (the machine) 
does, we would know the answer without any analysis.  
Applying a language-conduit-style theory to machine-
generated data would, as it does with interpreters, leave open the 
possibility that defendants would be entitled to cross-examine 
operators who did not act as a mere conduit for normal operation 
of the machine. This test would also filter out humans 
communicating through machines, e.g. via word processors, 
because the operator would then be acting as more than a mere 
conduit. However, this approach presumably would not use the 
actual factors from the language conduit cases as they pertain to 
                                            
226.  See United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1264 n.23 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(“[C]ertain statements involve so little intervention by humans in their generation 
as to leave no doubt that they are wholly machine-generated for all practical 
purposes.”). 
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seemingly unrelated issues, e.g. whether the parties acted in a 
manner consistent with the translation. A language conduit 
approach should also omit that doctrine’s use of notions of 
reliability: relying on the reliability of the translator (or machine) 
and whether the translator (operator-analysts) had any motive to 
fabricate would be in tension with the post-Crawford Confrontation 
Clause that is divorced from assurances of reliability.227 However, 
even as revised, this test would raise the difficult case-by-case 
questions that plague the control test. And, like the control test, it 
depends on the underlying theory that the non-assertive actions by 
some human assistants merits deeming them co-authors of the 
statement merely because the purpose of using the machine is to 
generate an assertion. 
Both the control test and conduit test could also have 
unexpected breadth. For example, suppose a burglar broke into a 
building and, in the course of doing so, cut a padlock. A suspect is 
brought into custody along with his cutting shears. A forensic 
analyst receives the cut lock and the shears and, using the same 
brand of lock, cuts the lock to compare the tool marks to those on 
the lock from the crime scene. Are the tool marks left on the test 
lock the statement of that analyst? The analyst merely undertook a 
physical process, selecting and cutting the lock, and has not yet 
compared them. The tool marks are functionally “raw data” from 
the shears, and the analyst is the operator of that tool. Are the raw 
data tool marks to be considered an assertion by the analyst? 
The control test might answer yes to that question. The 
analyst exercised control over the intensity and frequency of the 
force used in the cutting (e.g. one hard push versus multiple 
cumulative pushes), and did so in an arguably formal setting (a lab 
undertaking investigation into a known crime) for the purpose of 
generating evidence that could be used in a future trial. Although 
cutting tools are not machines in the normal sense of that word, 
they are not so different in complexity from other things that are, 
such as an analog scale or a thermometer.  
That problem, assuming it is a problem, could be 
addressed with a new requirement: devices, to qualify for the sui 
generis machine-generated data exception, must (a) be designed to 
make assertions about reality, and (b) have been used in that 
                                            
227.  See, e.g., United States v. Blazier, 69 M.J. 218, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2010) 
(“While ‘reliability’ is the end, the right of confrontation is the means, and it is 
the means (rather than the end) that the Sixth Amendment insists upon.”); cf. 
United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013) (reconsidering and 
criticizing the language conduit theory in light of Crawford). 
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assertive capacity for the data at issue. That definitional limitation 
would exclude tool marks from many tools because they are not 
made for the purpose of generating assertions about reality. But, 
without that definitional limitation, the control test and even the 
conduit test could encompass the assertive physical actions that do 
not involve classic assertive machines. For some, that flexibility 
would be a strength. For others, it sinks the entire theory of 
attributing raw data to human operators because the tests sweep in 
too much. 
Perhaps because of the difficulty in line-drawing, judges 
have, with few exceptions, concluded that essentially all machine-
generated data does not trigger the Confrontation Clause.228 That 
approach is defensible. First, it is the cleaner line to draw in the 
sand as it is easy to apply: all machine data, minus examples such 
as the word processor letter, are deemed statements of machines. 
Second, by emphasizing in Bullcoming that the analyst there 
certified “more than a machine-generated number,” the Court 
arguably suggested that the machine-generated number was not 
concerning under the Confrontation Clause.229 Third, the parallel 
cases on videos and photographs offer an additional column of 
support, though it is limited support because these cases are often 
based in part on the idea that photos and videos are merely 
demonstrative evidence.230 That premise is debatable when 
pictures and videos—such as of the crime, the victim’s wounds, and 
of the crime scene—serve as substantive evidence of guilt that goes 
beyond accompanying testimony.  
A stronger argument that machine assistants are not subject 
to confrontation and cross-examination is the fact that the data 
produced by machines is the result of a physical process external 
to the machine operators. A GC-MS is simply a tool, albeit a 
sophisticated one, and the results of its analysis depend upon a 
series of physical, non-assertive steps. The results of other physical 
non-assertive processes are not usually seen as “statements” of the 
person that initiated them.231 And just as a non-assertive question is 
                                            
228.  See supra Part III. 
229.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011); see also THE 
NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 25, § 4.12.5. 
230.  See supra Part IV. 
231.  As one commentator described this argument, “at a theoretical level, it 
is hard to distinguish most of the records deemed to be computer-generated 
from footprints left in the mud outside the scene of a crime.” Erick J. Poorbaugh, 
Interfacing Your Accuser: Computerized Evidence and the Confrontation 
Clause Following Melendez-Diaz, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 213, 226 (2011). 
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distinct from an answer, so too are the human assistants’ non-
assertive physical actions distinct from the machine’s assertion. 
Thus, courts are on strong ground in concluding that, 
except as to humans communicating through machines, machines 
are the real declarants and the Confrontation Clause does not 
reach them. Courts could adhere to that path because: (1) the 
operator contribution to most machines is de minimis; (2) the 
courts reject the premise that non-assertive actions made to enable 
another to make an assertion render the operator a co-author; or 
(3) drawing lines for sufficient operator involvement is difficult and 
potentially arbitrary, and the Supreme Court has cautioned against 
Confrontation Clause tests that are too malleable.232  
This result is the status quo and, though constitutionally 
sound, is disconcerting. It reduces the amount of exposure analysts 
have to cross-examination and confrontation because, instead of a 
constitutional right to confront and question analysts, there are only 
evidentiary rights of lesser potency that, as seen in Roberts and 
indicated in Crawford, are less predictable and easier to satisfy in 
ways that do not involve the analyst who is most likely to know if 
he or she ran the right test, followed procedures, cut corners, 
fabricated the evidence, etc.233 Cross-examination has exposed 
some forensic errors, and there are forensic errors—both from 
sloppy work and from malfeasance—to expose.234 Surrogate 
analysts are not a reliable way to catch those errors because, unless 
the surrogates are complicit in the inadequacy or malfeasance they 
will not know about those issues (and if they are complicit, the 
surrogate surely will not reveal that fact). A broad shield against 
cross-examining the only people who are likely to know about 
errors and fraud is in tension with the Supreme Court’s concerns in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming that forensic results are powerful 
evidence that is sometimes flawed and should be subject to cross-
examination.235 
Further, as machines become increasingly automated, the 
Confrontation Clause will shrink further under the status quo 
model. There is little limit to what machines will be able to do in 
                                            
232.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
233.  States could also interpret their constitution in a manner creating such 
a constitutional right, but unless the state constitutions contained a different-in-
scope confrontation clause, they could meet the same problems that led courts 
to conclude the federal Confrontation Clause does not encompass machine-
generated data. 
234.  See supra note 8. 
235.  See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318-19 (2009); 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714-15 (2011). 
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time, and they already do many tasks that were once accomplished 
by human analysts that would have been subject to cross-
examination.236 It is not difficult to imagine a lab where evidence 
collected from the crime scene by a forensic drone is tagged with a 
digital marker and fed through a series of automated machines in 
an assembly line of analysis, producing data with minimal human 
oversight. Again, that outcome is not inherently bad—it might 
decrease both errors and opportunities for malfeasance—but it 
would, under a model that treats all machine-generated data as the 
statement of a machine, reduce further the utility of the 
Confrontation Clause as it pertains to forensic science, which is 
often an important piece of trials for the most serious criminal 
matters. That result is inconsistent with the Court’s apparent desire 
in Davis to prevent the Confrontation Clause from having an 
expiration date237 and the principles expressed by the majority in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.238 An alternative model that 
declines to categorically classify data from forensic machines as 
machine-generated would be more in line with the purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause.239 
Perhaps the only clear non-arbitrary boundary that can be 
drawn is between humans communicating through machines (e.g., 
writing letters in a word processor) and humans using machines for 
everything else. What that approach gains in simplicity it loses in 
flexibility, and it would be just as easy to attribute all machine data 
to the humans who pushed start or set the parameters. However, 
both approaches fail to respond, as categorical rules, to the variety 
of machines and levels of control operators exercise from case to 
case.  
A case-by-case approach would be more protective of the 
right to confrontation. By attributing machine-generated testimony 
to the controlling analysts, the model would preserve the right to 
cross-examine some analysts and thereby potentially expose their 
errors. It would also recognize that forensic machines are simply 
sophisticated tools that humans use to make assertions about the 
                                            
236.  See, e.g., supra notes 3-6 (noting machine advances). 
237.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 n.5 (2006) (“Restricting the 
Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was originally 
directed is a recipe for its extinction.”). 
238.  See supra note 8 (listing the many examples of forensic errors and 
fabrication). 
239.  Cf. State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1, 18-19 (R.I. 2012) (analyzing the extent to 
which an allele table depicting information about DNA analysis was created by 
an analyst based on machine-generated data as opposed to data generated by a 
machine an analyst operated). 
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world. If analysis was pursued with chemistry vials, would the 
resulting data be statements of the beakers and solutions that the 
chemist used? In that regard, and in light of the ever-increasing 
capabilities of automated forensic analysis, this approach would 
also extend the lifespan of the Confrontation Clause. 
The Confrontation Clause offers no clear answer to the 
question of attribution for machine-generated data. Both 
approaches described herein—either attributing machine-generated 
data to human agents or declining to do so and attributing the data 
to only the machine or its progenitors—are defensible. By 
attributing some machine-generated data to the controlling 
analysts, courts could preserve the function of the Confrontation 
Clause despite the increase in semi-automated machines. That 
result is consistent with the purposes of the Clause as well. Courts, 
however, have taken the other path, and the reach of the 
Confrontation Clause has contracted meaningfully. 
G. Flawed Counterarguments for Machine-Generated Testimony 
Although there are difficult questions surrounding the 
machine-generated testimony doctrine, some questions should not 
be seen as presenting the difficulty that courts sometimes ascribe to 
them. Three such issues warrant brief mention. They are the 
theory that: (1) the analyst who operated the machine had no way 
of knowing that the results would implicate the defendant, and thus 
the data was not testimony “against an accused” under the 
Confrontation Clause,240 (2) there would be no value in cross-
examining analysts who perform hundreds of tests and are unlikely 
to recall any particular one,241 and (3) analysts could not testify to 
anything except how they ran the tests because it was the machines 
that made the actual statements about the results.242 
Courts should not find these claims persuasive. First, the 
fact that an analyst does not know the result of the test in a 
criminal case does not change that it is a test run to generate 
                                            
240.  See People v. Doe, 959 N.Y.S.2d 839, 843 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (“[H]ere, the 
criminalist who lifted the print and who was unavailable, or any other criminalist 
who could have lifted the print, would have no way of knowing that it would 
later implicate defendant as having his prints on the note.”).  
241.  See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 480-81 (Cal. 2012) (Werdegar, 
J., concurring, joined by three other California Justices) (addressing annotations 
made by lab assistants). 
242.  See, e.g., People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 931-32 (N.Y. 2009) (“These 
technicians would not have been able to offer any testimony other than how 
they performed certain procedures.”). 
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evidence for foreseeable use at a criminal trial. All evidence tends 
to incriminate some and exculpate others. That evidence is 
exculpatory to some (because the fingerprint or DNA profile 
identified does not match one suspect’s biometrics) does not 
change that it incriminates the true perpetrator simultaneously. For 
this reason and those noted in discussing the Williams plurality’s 
“targeted” test, courts should not find this counter-argument 
persuasive. 
Next, although someone who performs any task hundreds 
of times is unlikely to remember a specific performance, he will 
remember if he routinely fabricates data or fails to follow testing 
procedures, and the specter of potential cross-examination will 
help dissuade some from doing either. Thus, to the extent that 
courts consider policy and practicality considerations under the 
Confrontation Clause, this counter-argument is not persuasive 
because the ability to cross-examine and confront the operator-
analyst will have benefits. 
Finally, for similar reasons, the argument that the only thing 
the analyst can testify to is his or her testing procedures (because 
the machine made the statements) is not persuasive. That “only 
thing” is exactly why the analyst’s testimony is needed. The analyst 
can say whether he or she followed procedure or fabricated 
evidence, either specifically or as a general matter, and can also 
indicate his or her competency. The analyst need not be 
intentionally sloppy to realize on the stand that he or she made a 
mistake; even a careful analyst, under the crucible of cross-
examination, might realize that a different path was required. 
Again, to the extent policy and practicality considerations matter, 
this counter-argument is not persuasive. 
H. The Problem of Source and Implicit Assertions 
Suppose a court concludes that machine-generated data is 
not a statement to which the Confrontation Clause applies or that 
such data is not testimonial. At least two problems remain in 
admitting the raw data: what specific person or object is its data 
about, and does the data include an implicit assertion by the 
operating analyst? The data, to the extent that it is purely machine-
generated, cannot reveal source information: a human’s assertion 
that the data pertains to, e.g., blood sample XYZ is often required. 
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Some courts have noted this problem of source,243 but not all of 
them view it as problematic under the Confrontation Clause.244 
An assertion that the data came from testing a specific 
sample will be testimonial in many cases because it will be made to 
link a sample to forensic tests run in the context of generating 
evidence pertaining to a non-hypothetical crime. Accordingly, even 
where no Confrontation Clause right arises as to the machine-
generated data, the prosecution should generally need to proffer a 
witness who can attest, from first-hand knowledge, that the data 
came from testing the specific sample at issue.245 Similarly, if the 
prosecutor wants to show that the sample was still sealed 
immediately before it was tested, that proper testing protocols were 
actually followed during the test, etc., the data, if machine-
generated, cannot do so today—a human must so assert, and that 
assertion will often be testimonial. The obvious person to call for 
                                            
243.  See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 494 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., 
dissenting) (“[The surrogate analyst who testified at court] purported to offer his 
own independent analysis of the gas chromatography results. But his testimony 
had no value without the critical link between defendant’s blood sample and the 
test results.”); Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(“[A]ll [the testifying supervisor, who was not present during the testing,] could 
say from personal knowledge was that she compared electropherograms 
[machine-generated data] and they matched; she could not say from personal 
knowledge whose electropherograms they were or how they were derived.”); 
United States v. Drayton, Criminal No. PWG-13-0251, 2014 WL 2919792, at *11 
(D. Md. June 26, 2014) (concluding the testifying supervisor—who did not run 
the tests at issue—appeared to lack “the requisite knowledge to tie [the 
defendant] to the Sample” and recommending that “in the future the 
Government would be wise to provide a witness with personal knowledge of the 
provenance of materials on which an expert relies”); see also State v. Ortiz-Zape, 
743 S.E.2d 156, 170 (N.C. 2013) (Hudson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2660 (2014); Cranston v. State, 936 N.E.2d 342, 345-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); THE 
NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 25, § 4.12.5. 
244.  See Lopez, 286 P.3d at 478-79 (concluding that information pertaining 
to the “Booking #,” “Lab Number,” “Sample Sealed,” “Subject’s Name,” and 
“Arresting Officer,” was not testimonial under the Confrontation Clause because 
it was not sufficiently formal or solemn as the analysts involved had not “signed, 
certified, or swor[n] to the truth of the contents” and the report said “FOR LAB 
USE ONLY”). This result is problematic. Forensic analysis undertaken in 
connection with investigation into a crime—and especially analysis that expressly 
notes that there is an arresting officer and therefore directly relate to the 
potential loss of liberty for someone—is not unlike interrogation.  
245.  See, e.g., Richard Friedman, Thoughts on Melendez-Diaz: The 
Product of Machines, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG (Dec. 18, 2008, 1:43 AM), 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2008/12/thoughts-on-melendez-diaz-
product-of.html (discussing these problems as “the input proposition” and “the 
output proposition”). 
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these purposes is the operator-analyst who unsealed the sample, 
ran the test, followed procedures, and ultimately produced the 
data.  
Next, are there implicit testimonial assertions by the analyst-
operator in the raw data an analyst submits to a supervisor or 
court? If, for example, an analyst using a forensic machine submits 
data about a sample, a court could conclude that the submission of 
the data implicitly asserts that it is about the sample at issue and 
that it is not somehow fraudulent. These assertions would, 
presumably, be more pronounced and solemn where the operator 
signaled his or her approval of the data, such as by signing or 
initialing it. Courts are not in agreement on the validity of this 
proposition, however.246 Notably, if the data is an implicit assertion 
by the non-testifying operator, it will also often be testimonial 
because it was prepared to analyze a specific sample that is 
relevant to a criminal investigation.  
This argument could find limited support in other areas of 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. First, if an interpreter 
implicitly asserts that his or her translation of the statements at issue 
is accurate,247 a lab analyst who produces data from operating a 
machine could be said to implicitly assert that he or she produced 
accurate results. As the Eleventh Circuit stated in Curbelo, a case 
addressing that issue for interpreters, “[w]e doubt the prosecution 
in Bullcoming or Melendez–Diaz could have avoided the 
                                            
246.  Compare Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(“[T]he [data at issue] do[es] not stand on [its] own but, instead, ha[s] meaning 
because [it] amount[s] to a communication by the scientists who produced [it]—
the assertion, essentially, that the scientists generated these specific results by 
properly performing certain tests and procedures on particular, uncorrupted 
evidence and correctly recording the outcomes.”) with Lopez, 286 P.3d at 478 
(emphasis added): 
Turning first to the laboratory report's pages 2 through 6, 
they consist entirely of data generated by a gas 
chromatography machine to measure calibrations, quality 
control, and the concentration of alcohol in a blood 
sample. Even though nontestifying analyst Peña’s signature 
appears on the laboratory report’s second page (the 
printout of the machine's calibrations) and the remaining 
pages bear the handwritten initials “JRP” (presumably 
Jorge Peña’s initials), no statement by Peña, express or 
implied, appears on any of those pages. 
247.  See United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2013), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 962 (2014) (addressing this point as to an interpreter’s 
translation). 
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Confrontation Clause simply by admitting the numeric or chemical 
results of the blood-alcohol or cocaine tests without an analyst’s 
certification about how he arrived at those results.”248 
Some courts have reached a similar conclusion. As one 
court stated, “it is too simplistic to say th[at a machine-generated] 
printout of” DNA profiles and related information “were not 
hearsay because they were nothing more than raw data produced 
by a machine. ‘[D]ata that appears to be produced by a machine 
may depend on inputs that require judgment or permit 
subjectivity, and these inputs may well be appropriately 
characterized as testimonial [hearsay].’”249 Machine-generated 
results “do not stand on their own but, instead, have meaning 
because they amount to a communication by the scientists who 
produced them—the assertion, essentially, that the scientists 
generated these specific results by properly performing certain tests 
and procedures on particular, uncorrupted evidence and correctly 
recording the outcomes.”250 
However, this “implicit-assertion” approach reaches too far. 
If a custodian of record produces a compilation of relevant 
records, the same rationale could lead courts to conclude that the 
custodian implicitly asserted that the records were the only relevant 
items. Or, a technician who pulled recorded inmate phone calls for 
a criminal proceeding could be required to testify because that 
technician implicitly asserted that those were the only relevant 
                                            
248.  Id. at 1273. However, Curbelo’s support is limited by the court’s 
conclusion in that case that the translator’s implicit assertion that the translation 
was accurate was not shared with the jury, even though the transcripts were 
introduced at trial. Id. at 1274. The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion here is strange. 
If the interpreter’s assertion that the translation is accurate is implicit in the 
translation itself, see id. at 1272 (“The translator's only assertion in the transcripts 
is his or her implicit statement that the translation was accurate.”) (first emphasis 
added), and the translated transcript was admitted as evidence, id. at 1265 (“the 
Government provided the jury an English-language transcript”), then that 
implicit assertion of accuracy is also before the jury in the translation itself. 
Perhaps Curbelo was simply a harmless error holding, the idea that the implicit 
assertion of accuracy was insignificant because another participant/defendant in 
the conversations reviewed them and testified to their accuracy, but the court 
did not so describe its holding in concluding that “the transcripts’ admission did 
not violate the Confrontation Clause.” But see id. at 1274 (“Here, by contrast, 
the Government did not introduce the transcripts on the weight of the 
translator’s certification, but on Diaz’s testimony.”). 
249.  Young, 63 A.3d at 1046 (quoting THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT 
EVIDENCE, supra note 25, § 4.12.5) (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks and footnotes omitted). 
250.  Id. 
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calls.251 It could even lead to the right to cross-examine individuals 
who undertake more ministerial or mechanical actions in a forensic 
setting,252 such as extracting a substance to be analyzed from a 
sample253 because, in that process, the technicians could be said to 
implicitly assert that the result was not fabricated or otherwise in 
breach of lab protocols. However, requiring testimony from all of 
these individuals would be in tension with the Court’s observation 
in Melendez-Diaz that the Sixth Amendment does not require 
testimony from every person involved in the chain of custody.254 It 
would also be treating unspoken assertions as solemn/formal. For 
these reasons, the concept of implicit assertions of accuracy 
triggering the Confrontation Clause is problematic.  
Notably, these are technological problems: if the machine 
had the capability to scan and verify an unadulterated seal, the 
machine could make that assertion. Similarly, if the machine self-
selects its parameters, no human need make that assertion either. 
Even the problem of source could be solved by convoluted (but 
not unimaginable) technology: a drone using 3D laser scanning 
maps a crime scene,255 uses forensic-based algorithms to identify a 
potential sample at the crime scene, collects it, tags it with a digital 
identifier, sends the sample to a lab, and the lab analyzes it with 
automated machines. With no humans vouching for the source, the 
machines make the source assertion instead. This example is 
science fiction today, though some of the parts exist in isolation. 
Thus, even the problem of source and related concepts can be 
resolved by technology. This is not inherently a problem, but it 
challenges the role the Confrontation Clause will play in the future 
and, in some instances, the present. In the interim, however, the 
problem of source is best solved by calling the analyst who 
operated the machine.256 
                                            
251.  See, e.g., State v. Estell, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0846, 2012 WL 6176790, at 
*5-6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2012). 
252.  See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 686 F. Supp. 2d 382, 386 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff'd, 401 F. App’x 565 (2d Cir. 2010). 
253.  See, e.g., Aguilar v. Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 215, 217 (Va. 2010) 
(finding no Confrontation Clause violation when one expert relied on, inter alia, 
human-operated robotic extraction and processing of DNA samples by another 
technician). 
254.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009). 
255.  See Li, supra note 5. 
256.  Cf. THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 25, § 4.12.5 
(discussing the problem of source and noting that, even as to machine-generated 
data, without the testimony of an operating analyst a surrogate witness cannot 
link the sample to the defendant or testify that proper procedures were followed 
during the test); Richard Friedman, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG, Thoughts on 
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I. Adapting the Confrontation Clause to the Rise of Machines 
At least one option remains: the Confrontation Clause 
might evolve. As automated machines increasingly rise to perform 
the tasks that once were undertaken by human witnesses, the 
accused’s right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” 
might expand to allow “confronting” machines.257 Although the 
Confrontation Clause seeks to ensure reliability through 
confrontation and cross-examination, where those tools are not 
feasible in the traditional sense (how do you cross-examine a 
machine?), the Clause might be interpreted to promote reliability 
through analogous means. 
Such an approach would not be unheard of; as noted 
previously, courts could look to the models used for interpreters258 
or canine evidence.259 Just as there are special requirements for 
admission of canine evidence, so too could there be special 
requirements for data generated by forensic machines. Courts 
could adopt those requirements from the canine or interpreter tests 
and apply them to forensic machines or, alternatively, they could 
effectively constitutionalize a version of evidentiary requirements or 
discovery rules.260 Finally, other commentators have suggested 
potential ways the Clause might respond to scientific evidence in 
particular, such as by requiring the analyst who prepared the 
report to testify when available.261 
These models all seek to preserve the thrust of the Clause, 
confrontation and cross-examination, in an era the Framers did not 
necessarily foresee. Failure to meet the governing test—for 
                                            
Melendez-Diaz: The Product of Machines, The Confrontation Blog, (Dec. 18, 
2008, 1:43 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2008/12/thoughts-on-
melendez-diaz-product-of.html (discussing these problems as “the input 
proposition” and “the output proposition”). 
257.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; cf. Merritt Baer, Who Is the Witness to an 
Internet Crime: The Confrontation Clause, Digital Forensics, and Child 
Pornography, 30 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 49 (2013) 
(noting that “digital evidence will only exacerbate [problems such as those under 
the Confrontation Clause], as we collect and retain drastically more data, and 
rely more heavily upon intelligent Internet-based analysis systems to process that 
data”). 
258.  See supra Part III. 
259.  See, e.g., Starkes v. United States, 427 A.2d 437, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
State v. Streeper, 747 P.2d 71, 75 (Idaho 1987); cf. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 
1050 (2013). 
260.  Cf. United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 
261.  See, e.g., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 25, 
§§ 4.10.2, 4.12.2, 4.12.10. 
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example, failing to establish the accuracy of the machine, 
adherence to testing protocols, and that the data was generated 
from the defendant’s sample—could, as a constitutional matter, 
require exclusion of the evidence. Reinterpreting the 
Confrontation Clause in these ways would raise many questions: 
would anyone other than the operating analyst have to testify to 
satisfy these requirements? What protection would such a right 
give to defendants in light of existing evidentiary rules and other 
constitutional provisions? Would this right also apply to dog 
handlers, interpreters, photographers, and videographers? But, in 
light of the rise of the machines, such a reimagined Confrontation 
Clause might be necessary. As one dissenting California justice 
phrased it: 
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether 
machine-generated results invariably lie beyond the reach 
of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause, and I express no ultimate 
view on this issue here. I simply note that as a result of ever 
more powerful technologies, our justice system has 
increasingly relied on ex parte computerized 
determinations of critical facts in criminal proceedings—
determinations once made by human beings. A crime lab’s 
reliance on gas chromatography may be a marked 
improvement over less accurate or more subjective 
methods of determining blood-alcohol levels. The allure of 
such technology is its infallibility, its precision, its 
incorruptibility. But I wonder if that allure should prompt 
us to remain alert to constitutional concerns, lest we 
gradually recreate through machines instead of magistrates 
the civil law mode of ex parte production of evidence that 
constituted the “principal evil at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed.”262 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The rise of the machines presents difficult questions based 
on technological changes. Should the right to cross-examine really 
depend on whether a gas chromatograph selects its own operating 
parameters, or whether a scale or breathalyzer prints out results 
instead of requiring someone to write them out by hand? One 
answer is to attribute such data to the machine/progenitors and the 
                                            
262.  People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 494 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004)). 
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operator. However, the Confrontation Clause does not clearly 
require that answer, and it is reasonable to conclude that data from 
human-operated machines is not attributable to the operator. In 
light of those dueling options, it is more consistent with the 
Confrontation Clause’s goals if courts adopt a model that preserves 
a right to cross-examine human operators in circumstances where 
the operator exercises control over the machine. Although today’s 
forensic tools are increasingly complex, the right to cross-examine 
should not be lost in so many circuit boards.   
Under the current interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause, however, the right to cross-examine some individuals, 
especially in the forensic setting, faces an approaching extinction. 
Science increasingly delivers machines possessing fully automated 
processes such that the only people who contribute to the 
machine’s speech are the progenitors. This effective expiration 
date on a portion of the Confrontation Clause is a possibility the 
Court disfavored in Davis,263 but that, in time, will arrive. It is not 
unusual for constitutional rights to contract and expand in the face 
of technological change; Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has 
long recognized that fact.264 The current status quo is, nonetheless, 
troubling. For now, that expiration has not arrived because some 
machines still require analyst input; the dawn of fully autonomous 
machines has not yet arrived. But the horizon is a familiar orange, 
and the sun is steadily ascending; the rise of the machines has only 
begun. 
                                            
263.  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 n.5 (2006) (“Restricting the 
Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was originally 
directed is a recipe for its extinction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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